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INTRODUCTION 
Around the world, numerous attempts have been made to solve 
difficult, yet pressing issues within human rights and environmental 
law. Many have fallen short, some even at times when they were—
and still are—needed the most. But despite this bleak background, 
there is yet hope: persistent and innovative legal thinking at the sub-
national level has created new action in areas previously marked by 
relative or near-complete inaction on the part of national governments 
and supranational organizations. Civil society and local governments 
can, by taking note of such developments, gain more insight into how 
to move their agenda forward through new channels. Time has come 
for local actors and civil society to stop looking to large-scale action 
that may or may not come about in a timely fashion. This Article 
proposes that bottom-up, polycentric developments within national 
and international environmental and human rights law present viable 
and strong alternatives to traditional top-down solutions, especially in 
relation to problems that require urgent legal action. The Article does 
not, however, suggest that traditional solutions are no longer called 
for. Rather, it promotes action from both angles. 
The Article starts by analyzing the notion of “law” in order to 
demonstrate that law does not only consist of formal positive law, but 
also comprises broader concepts of a universally accepted nature, 
whether or not officially adopted by governments. This section will 
additionally explore what “international law” means in an American 
context and briefly discuss whether our concept of law is, in general, 
unnecessarily limited to Western ideals. The purpose of the section is 
to demonstrate that many of the notions that form part of the 
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discourse in both environmental and human rights law—whether seen 
as separate or intertwined issues—such as what is “right” and 
“wrong,” already form part of a wider view of the notion of law itself. 
An awareness of this can be used in promoting the incorporation of 
such aspects into formal law. 
The Article proceeds to examine the two major methods of 
lawmaking: top-down or bottom-up solutions. The main advantages 
and disadvantages of each will be briefly analyzed in order to 
demonstrate the many recognized advantages of bottom-up law 
creation to law-and-policy-makers and stakeholders at the local and 
non-local scales. This will support the theory of the Article, namely 
that lawmaking involving local actors and civil society is 
unavoidable, and that this a boon to society. 
The Article then briefly describes why law is observed at all.1 
Advocates for change in the human rights and environmental law 
fields can rely upon this insight in framing arguments for broader 
legal or quasi-legal protections of our human and natural 
environments. 
This introductory material will serve as a framework of reference 
for the argument that if we take new approaches to both the creation 
and enforcement of law, valuable and urgently needed legal and other 
social progress can be created in shorter timeframes than if waiting 
for more sluggish national and supranational action. After explaining 
how human rights and the environment can be seen as separate or 
merged disciplines, it will become apparent that even where they are 
separate, lessons learned in one will typically be applicable in the 
other as well. The specific lessons presented in this Article will be 
drawn from experiments with localized action in four select cities 
across the United States and one in the EU. Some of the experiments 
relate only to human rights, others only to environmental issues. The 
lessons are, of course, also valuable to those instances in which 
environmental issues are seen as human rights issues and to a broader 
range of situations where bottom-up lawmaking may prove expedient. 
Many scholarly articles have debated the need for alternatives to 
traditional top-down lawmaking. This Article builds on such 
scholarship and creates new value in two ways. First, the original 
research for this Article analyzes select examples of bottom-up 
 
1 However, the Article does not consider any court resolutions to the substantive 
problems at issue because the main purpose of the Article is to analyze the development of 
law rather than the enforcement thereof. 
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lawmaking to examine the on-the-ground implementation of the 
theory and to identify those aspects thereof that appear the most 
illustrative of lessons that can be repeated as well as pitfalls to avoid. 
Second, the Article produces new value in setting forth guidelines for 
legal practitioners and scholars seeking to further promote and apply 
the development of law at the bottom-up, polycentric level. The 
Article will also serve as the launching point for the author’s parallel 
project, which more narrowly examines whether pursuing climate 
change action at the sub-national, sub-state level with or without 
government interaction is successful and how “success” can be 
measured in relation to climate change in particular.2 
I 
WHAT IS “LAW”? 
In order to understand how human rights law and environmental 
law may develop from multiple angles, it helps to initially consider 
the spectrum of what may be said to constitute “the law.” However, as 
the purpose of this Article is to shed light on some practical and 
current ways of developing new law, the Article purposefully will not 
provide a full socio-philosophical description of the notion of law. 
Rather, this section is meant to provide only a broad framework for 
later reference in this Article and for possible use by civil society and 
government practitioners and policymakers. The section starts from a 
general perspective and then hones in on international law. 
A. Law Broadly Defined 
We typically think of “law” as common law and codes, statutes, 
and regulations traditionally applied and enforced in courts of law, in 
other words that which is known as formal or “positive law.”3 This 
definition encompasses “[t]he regime that orders human activities and 
 
2 Myanna Dellinger, Localizing the Law of Climate Change, 14 MINN. J. L. SCI. & 
TECH. (forthcoming 2013). 
3 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1280 (9th ed. 2009) (“A system of law 
promulgated and implemented within a particular political community by political 
superiors, as distinct from moral law or law existing in an ideal community or in some 
nonpolitical community. Positive law typically consists of enacted law—the codes, 
statutes, and regulations that are applied and enforced in the courts. The term derives from 
the medieval use of positum (Latin ‘established’), so that the phrase positive law literally 
means law established by human authority.”). Positive law “only considers law flowing 
down from the sovereign as true law” and may thus be said to be “manufactured” law. 
Prabhakar Singh, From ‘Narcissistic’ Positive International Law to ‘Universal’ Natural 
International Law: The Dialectics of ‘Absentee Colonialism,’ 16 AFR. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 
56, 59 (2008). 
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relations through systematic application of the force of politically 
organized society, or through social pressure, backed by force, in 
such a society.”4 Thus, what at first blush appears to encompass a 
relatively “soft” normative concept—social pressure—may actually 
take on some force, but only if enforced by societal institutions such 
as courts of law. Whereas experts taking the traditional view of law 
may question the notion that untraditional, softer concepts have much 
legal relevance, others take quite another stance on this issue: 
Some twenty years ago I pointed out two ideas running through 
definitions of law: one an imperative idea, an idea of a rule laid 
down by the lawmaking organ of a politically organized society, 
deriving its force from the authority of the sovereign; and the other 
a rational or ethical idea, an idea of a rule of right and justice 
deriving its authority from its intrinsic reasonableness or 
conformity to ideals of right and merely recognized, not made, by 
the sovereign.5 
The notion that law does not only consist of positive law is further 
supported by the theory applying to natural law, also known as “lex 
naturalis.” Natural law is a theory of jurisprudence that contends that 
law has its origin and justification in absolute standards of right and 
wrong.6 It thus encompasses a broader notion that “law” may also be 
seen as behavioral, ethical, or social norms;7 in other words, as 
“universal principles of morality and justice.”8 In the 1960s, a group 
of scholars developed the sub-concept of “new natural law.”9 In spite 
of its name, this theory takes a mainly conservative, pre-
Enlightenment view of the law as it relates to, for example, issues of 
homosexuality, marriage, and contraception.10 New natural law 
adherents argue that “there are moral absolutes, that is, norms that 
specify certain acts as of a sort that are always and everywhere not to 
be done.”11 To distinguish the two belief systems, the phrase 
 
4 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 3, at 962 (emphasis added). 
5 Roscoe Pound, More About the Nature of Law, in LEGAL ESSAYS IN TRIBUTE TO 
ORRIN KIP MCMURRAY 513, 515 (1935) (emphasis added). 
6 Moore v. Ganim, 660 A.2d 742 (Conn. 1995). See also William P. Aspell, Natural 
Law in the Connecticut Tradition, 31 CONN. B.J. 105 (1957). 
7 Mohammed v. State, 561 So.2d 384, 385 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
8 Singh, supra note 3, at 57. 
9 Christopher Tollefsen, The New Natural Law Theory, 10 LYCEUM 1 (2008), available 
at http://lyceumphilosophy.com/?q=node/97. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 6. 
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“traditional natural law” or just “natural law” will in the following be 
used for the opposite of “new natural law.” 
Traditional and new natural law relate closely to the human rights 
and environmental law discourse. As for environmental law, the 
question has been raised whether traditional natural law supports 
taking an ecocentric view to environmental law or whether the 
purpose of such law should, more narrowly, be considered to only be 
to support human existence. Traditional natural law took the starting 
point that human “goods” such as life, knowledge, friendship, 
practical reason, play, religion, and aesthetic experience were mainly 
pursued for anthropocentric reasons.12 Thus, an ecocentric approach 
to environmental protection was only sometimes seen as justified.13 
Action was considered to be taken to benefit humankind, not the 
environment per se.14 Modernly, however, “actions can be taken for 
ethical and thus natural law reasons simply because they are ‘good,’ 
albeit not necessarily ‘good for’ human beings.15 For example, 
endangered species may be preserved out of a realization that the 
planet and its future generations of humans and non-humans will be 
better off for doing so. Another example is the concept that farm 
animals can be slaughtered in less painful ways than before simply 
because we now know how to do so, but also because our capacities 
have evolved experientially and developmentally, so although 
something is said to be purely natural (killing animals) for us, other 
entities also have ends that may sometimes have a value that is worth 
pursuing for its own sake. Thus, traditional natural law also supports 
ecocentric action for our sake although benefit to human goods is 
only indirect.16 
New natural law, in contrast, “[does] not afford the opportunity to 
ask whether there can be a reason for human action that is not 
connected to what is good for human beings.”17 In other words, 
whereas new natural law supports environmental protection, it does so 
only for anthropogenic reasons so long as human goods are at issue.18 
Nonetheless, new natural law and environmental action can go hand 
 
12 Bebhinn Donnelly & Patrick Bishop, Natural Law and Ecocentrism, 19 J. ENVTL. L. 
89, 92 (2007). 
13 Id. at 90. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. at 94. 
16 Id. at 101. Donnelly does not take a stance on whether or not it is morally sound for 
human beings to consume animals or slaughter them for other human purposes. 
17 Id. at 93. 
18 Id. at 94. 
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in hand. For example, the basic human good of life is often the 
rationale behind environmental protection in general and would thus 
be supported under the new natural law school of thought as well.19 
Similarly, urban and rural planning schemes can be analyzed in terms 
of furthering the basic good of aesthetic experience.20 The United 
States federal government has recognized the need for a clean, healthy 
environment as a prerequisite for the fostering of good societal 
relations just as the regime contained in the United States Wildlife 
and Countryside Act of 1981—which allows for the creation of Sites 
of Special Scientific Interest, National Nature Reserves and Marine 
Nature Reserves—references the human good of knowledge.21 And 
since human goods are the fundamental concern of the human rights 
discourse, new natural law supports a strong rationale for human 
rights legislation as well. 
Thus, whereas “new” and “traditional” natural law may differ 
greatly in some areas of the law that are currently the subject of much 
debate in the United States, the two theories converge in lending 
support to legal progress within environmental law, albeit the reasons 
for doing so differ. Finally, “[t]o maintain order and promote 
productivity, modern societies rely not only on formal law, but also 
on complex webs of nonlegal rules, including workplace rules, 
religious rules, ethical rules, and the community ‘rules’ of polite and 
cooperative behavior that [are known as] ‘social norms.’”22 
B. International Law 
A brief review of the components of international law is useful in 
remembering the full panorama of that which constitutes “law” and 
how it is created. 
Article 38.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ 
or the Court) identifies the three primary sources of international law 
as treaties, “international customs” (more commonly known as 
customary international law), and “general principles of law.” 
Treaties are simply legally binding agreements between two or more 
states.23 Customary international law contains two elements: (1) 
 
19 Id. 
20 Id. at 95. 
21 Id. at 94. 
22 LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE 
237 (2011). 
23 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(a), May 23, 1969, 155 U.N.T.S. 
331. 
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general practice that (2) is accepted as law.24 In turn, “general 
practice” contains two sub-elements: “general” and “practice.” Not all 
nation states need to follow a practice for it to be “general,” but it 
must be followed by most states, especially those affected by the 
custom.25 States who “persistently object” to the practice during the 
process of its formation will not be bound to it.26 Examples of 
“practice” are diplomatic acts and instructions, public measures, other 
governmental acts, and official statements of policy, whether 
unilateral or not.27 Practice is thus broadly evidenced by internal legal 
states of affairs such as domestic legislation, judicial decisions, 
internal government memoranda, ministerial statements,28 diplomatic 
correspondence, press releases, or opinions of legal advisers. In 
contrast, the question of whether failures to act fall under the 
“practice” umbrella is open to debate.29 For something to be 
“accepted as law,” it must constitute opinio juris: 
[I]n order to achieve this result, two conditions must be fulfilled. 
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice [the 
“objective element”], but they must also be such, or be carried out 
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this practice is 
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. 
The need for such a belief, i.e., the existence of a subjective 
element, is implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive 
necessitatis. The States concerned must therefore feel that they are 
conforming to what amounts to a legal obligation.30 
In other words, opinio juris31 correlates to a practice followed by 
nation states out of a sense of legal obligation as opposed to mere 
 
24 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 
1055. 
25 North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den., Ger./Neth.), Judgment & Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Lachs, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42, 43, 218, 229 (Feb. 20) [hereinafter North Sea 
Continental Shelf]; Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 98 
(June 27). 
26 STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (2006). 
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102 (1988). 
28 MCCAFFREY supra note 26, at 48. 
29 See, e.g., S.S. “Lotus” (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). 
30 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 25, at 44. 
31 A recent example of opinio juris can be found in a White House press release by the 
Obama administration stating about Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva 
Convention, which sets forth fundamental guarantees for persons in the hands of opposing 
forces in an international armed conflict, that “[a]lthough the Administration continues to 
have significant concerns with Additional Protocol I, Article 75 is a provision of the treaty 
that is consistent with our current policies and practice and is one that the United States 
has historically supported . . . The U.S. Government will therefore choose out of a sense of  
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protocol, habitual character, courtesy, convenience, or tradition.32 
States consistently objecting to international practices, declarations, 
statements, or resolutions that may otherwise be said to signify the 
existence of a rule of customary international law will not be held to 
such a rule.33 
Although customary international law has no precise counterpart at 
the domestic level in the United States, rough equivalents could be 
considered to be unwritten trade usage and custom in commercial 
law; the common law system itself, which was customary in nature 
before the courts began to write it down; or even social norms and 
etiquette.34 
General principles of law are those that are derived purely from the 
national law of the major legal systems of the world.35 They can be 
established by both legislatures and courts.36 In other words, general 
principles of law may be considered “gap fillers” in the international 
legal system if such principles are common to many systems of law. 
Jus cogens is a peremptory norm agreed upon by the international 
community as one from which a derogation may never occur because 
of fundamental concerns of ethics and thus also falls under 
international law. Examples of jus cogens are the prohibition against 
genocide, slavery, wars of pure aggression, and the recognition of 
territorial sovereignty.37 Finally, international law may also draw 
upon the teachings of “the most highly qualified publicists of the 
 
legal obligation to treat the principles set forth in Article 75 as applicable to any individual 
it detains in an international armed conflict, and expects all other nations to adhere to these 
principles as well.” Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantanamo 
and Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content 
/uploads/2011/03/Fact_Sheet_-_Guantanamo_and_Detainee_Policy.pdf. 
32 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 25, at 44. 
33 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 
226, ¶ 68 (July 8). 
34 MCCAFFREY, supra note 26, at 44. 
35 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
102(1)(c). 
36 MCCAFFREY, supra note 26, at 56. 
37 See, e.g., East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, 1995 I.C.J. 102 (June 30). Compare 
“jus gentium”—a form of natural law considered by some jurists to be innate in every 
human being; a higher law of moral obligation binding human beings beyond the 
requirements of civil law. See generally MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 3.17.69; 
MARCIA L. COLISH, THE STOIC TRADITION FROM ANTIQUITY TO THE EARLY MIDDLE 
AGES 150 (1985). 
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various nations.”38 Although the Trail Smelter arbitration case drew 
upon this source,39 doing so is relatively rare. 
Thus, just as the notion of law seen from a national point of view 
can cover other sources than positive law, so can international law. In 
fact, only treaties truly match the definition of positive law, as only 
they are formally adopted by governments in relation to action at the 
international level. The other sources—customary international law, 
general principles, jus cogens, and writings by eminent scholars—are 
drawn upon in their looser forms as gap-fillers, norms, and tradition, 
also not formal sources of law seen from a traditional point of view. 
Thus, actors developing law either at the international level or in 
relation to issues of international significance are already no strangers 
to encompassing “softer” concepts of law, which is positive in 
relation to further developments of human rights and environmental 
law. 
The above considerations are most often discussed in connection 
with “public international law,” which refers to controversies or 
conduct between nation states.40 “Private international law” refers to 
conflict of laws and the choice of applicable law in private disputes 
involving more than one jurisdiction.41 
C. “International Law”: A Universalist or Narcissistic Concept? 
Historically, “international” law developed from a Eurocentric 
angle in a highly colonized world. Natural law, which truly applies 
universally for the above-mentioned reasons, was dismissed in order 
to promote a type of international law that could justify colonialism.42 
Accordingly, the Western world and the “East” or “Global South” 
became divided between not only the colonizers and the colonized in 
general, but also on sharp cultural lines within notions of what 
constitutes law to begin with.43 “International law” scholarship 
declared itself superior to all that was non-European.44 Other belief 
systems were, at bottom, considered to be unable to present any case 
for equality of treatment under international law.45 This false 
 
38 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 24, at art. 38(1)(d). 
39 Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905 (Mar. 1941). 
40 MCCAFFREY, supra note 26, at 4. 
41 Id. 
42 Singh, supra note 3, at 77. 
43 Id. 
44 Singh, supra note 3, at 77. 
45 Id. 
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universality system justified interference in the “uncivilized world” 
by “civilized nations” that considered themselves culturally, and thus 
legally, superior.46 To a large extent, this is arguably still the case. 
The existing Western legal belief system has thus been called 
“narcissistic.”47 
In the meantime, the Global South has emerged as a vibrant socio-
political actor. Hence, non-Western notions of what constitutes 
international law should be included in the international legal 
vocabulary48 as well in order to obtain a more universally acceptable 
view of international law. Modernly, there can be true universality of 
“international law” only if it does not discriminate between, for 
example, Asian, African, or European systems of law.49 But it still 
does. However, after the addition to the International Court of Justice 
of non-European judges, the Court has, for example, started 
respecting the “natural law” aspect of international law, particularly in 
judgments and advisory opinions delivered by third world judges.50 
For example, the former Vice President of the ICJ, Justice 
Christopher Gregory Weeramantry of Sri Lanka, has stated that 
international law suffers from the “neglect of other cultures. . . . [It is] 
largely a monocultural construct . . . ; there was also a neglect of the   
. . . natural law background from which international law had its 
beginnings.”51 Modernly, international law is increasingly seen to also 
include ancient tenets of law offered by Hinduism, Buddhism, and 
Islam52 as parallel, but of course not inferior, value systems. Thus, in 
an advisory opinion on the legality of nuclear weapons, Justice 
Weeramantry cited to specific teachings from Hinduism about the 
prohibition of hyper-destructive weapons.53 
 
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., Singh, supra note 3, at 76. 
48 The concepts of “international law” or “international relations” may more correctly, 
although somewhat provocatively, also be termed “absentee colonialism” after the fall of 
Western colonization. For terminological scholarship, see, e.g., Singh supra note 3, at 70 
(“classic international law is gradually being replaced by a theory of international relations 
that boasts of a much more sophisticated vocabulary than diplomatic international law.”). 
49 Singh supra note 3, at 68. 
50 Id. at 78. 
51 Christopher G. Weeramantry, International Law and the Developing World: A 
Millennial Analysis, 41 HARV. INT’L L.J. 277, 278 (2000). 
52 Singh supra note 3, at 78. 
53 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 33. 
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The development of international law is thus continuing—and must 
still continue—as a global rather than a purely Western construct.54 
The problem with traditional international law is that it can be and 
still is used for various exploitative means and reasons.55 For 
example, postcolonial differentiations are still made based on 
economy and power. This is not only a problem in the human rights 
regime, but also in relation to climate change, where developing 
nations assert their right to develop without having to undertake total 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission commitments. The argument is that 
total emission commitments make it much more difficult for 
developing nations to enhance their economies and that per capita 
emissions are preferable. However, industrialized nations rather 
stubbornly cling to demands of total commitments from developing 
countries. To a very large extent, this status quo thus ignores or 
rejects the economic abilities and prospects of developing nations and 
threatens their very development—a narcissistic attitude indeed. 
Various kinds of injustices that currently prevail in relation to the 
Global South need to be addressed by truly reaching and applying a 
new epistemology of international law as regards the current broad 
spectrum of economic, cultural, distributive, environmental, and 
industrial injustice.56 Doing so would enable actors at various scales 
to invent and implement newer solutions to current environmental and 
human rights concerns. Seeing things from an interrelated and more 
holistic point of view would appropriately link modern notions of 
international and national law to traditional notions of natural law and 
thus make a full circle out of what is currently an inexpediently 
fragmented system of law.57 For “[i]t is in natural law that we can find 
the tenets that succour human kind, promote universal principles of 
equality and justice: all that is needed to make international law truly 
‘international’ and not just a ‘European’ or ‘American’ construct.”58 
D. “National” or “International” Law: Does it Matter? 
Much attention has been paid to the creation and improvement of 
law through conventional national sources of law, in particular 
through constitutional and other federal law (in the United States), EU 
and national law (in Europe), and international treaties at the 
 
54 Singh supra note 3, at 79. 
55 Id. at 81. 
56 Id. at 80. 
57 See, e.g., id. at 81. 
58 Id. at 81. 
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supranational level. But as has become evident, these sources are 
unlikely to create the substantive results that much of civil society is 
hoping for in many contexts, especially in a timely matter when it 
comes to pressing issues such as climate change. New ways of 
thinking are necessary. Similarly, the traditional difference between 
“international” and other systems of law is losing its significance as 
national borders and thus “national” law are becoming less and less 
well-defined both within public and private international law. 
“Borders are no longer as significant as they once were . . . . [T]hey 
are hardly impenetrable frontiers, but rather flimsy and insubstantial 
curtains of gauze, through which goods, ideas, and people flow rather 
easily.”59 
Nonetheless, federal and international sovereignty concerns are 
relevant to both the human rights and environmental law discourse in 
the United States. Here, federalism and other constitutional concerns 
abound as soon as the legal significance of any type of border, be it 
state or federal, is discussed. International readers who may be more 
accustomed to a perhaps more relaxed view on state borders being an 
aspect of life that legal society in general and courts in particular can 
relatively easily maneuver their way around may wish to consider the 
complexity of the United States federal system and the power 
struggles that arise here in relation to issues of sovereignty and 
federalism seen from both an international and a national point of 
view.60 It is—from a broader scholarly perspective—clear that 
 
59 Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 
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each of these court systems over nonresidents. In performing this seemingly narrow 
task, however, the doctrine necessarily implicates a vision of the nature of 
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[t]erritoriality and physicality—material connections in water, air, 
and land—[have traditionally been] centerpieces of jurisdictional 
authority, theory, and practice . . . . But we who think about courts 
will need to reassess assumptions—both of structure and of 
process—heretofore deeply rooted in the physical relationship of 
human beings on a specific piece of soil and a particular 
courthouse.61 
What does this mean to the change called for within human rights 
and environmental law alike? The answers to this question are outside 
the scope of this Article, but some of the issues that could be 
considered in future scholarship and in promoting new legal regimes 
are whether the concept of “one supreme sovereign” has become of 
diminished relevance in relation to some substantive areas of law. 
Scaled-down efforts may be taking over what used to be work more 
or less exclusively kept within the sovereign realm. To be sure, action 
at the sovereign level is still important, but it is necessary to continue 
examining how, if at all, sovereigns can address global problems such 
as climate change that appear to be too politically laden to be resolved 
at the macro level. Further, exactly who would be the “sovereign” to 
take such action—only a national sovereign, or also state, tribal, or 
indigenous sovereigns? In regards to sources of international law: if 
more nations adopted climate change legislation, might general 
principles of law or customary international law be just as effective or 
even more effective than treaties, to which most of us have looked for 
solutions so far? The problem with this line of argument is, however,  
a circular one, at least in the United States: both general principles of 
law and customary international law require a national sovereign to 
act, but this is precisely what the United States has so far and so often 
refused to do in both the climate change and human rights arenas. 
Perhaps it is time to expand our traditional views of sources of 
international law to also include action taken at smaller scale by local 
governments such as cities or regions. After all, effective action can 
and does spread upward from lower scales and needs to be 
implemented and enforced at the local level anyway. One thing has 
become clear: yesterday’s traditional thinking does not serve the 
global community well anymore in those areas of the law that have 
significant on-the-ground effects. New methods of the creation of law 
must be considered. 
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II 
HOW LAW IS CREATED 
Law and policy are typically created in one of two ways: by so-
called “top-down” or by “bottom-up” approaches. Many people 
probably think of law as being created only through formal top-down 
approaches, such as legislatures adopting new laws or judges creating 
common law. However, alternative and often overlooked avenues 
exist. These present valuable opportunities for progress where 
traditional regimes have failed or stalled. This section will set forth 
the advantages and disadvantages of both types of lawmaking. It 
posits that both bottom-up models and polycentric models are needed 
for the most effective and speedy change of law. 
A. Top-down Lawmaking 
Seen from a macro level, law is typically, in democratic legal 
systems, created in the form of statutes by elected legislatures who 
declare general principles that are to be applied in future situations 
(i.e., from the “top down”).62 Only rarely is legislation adopted to 
decide specific current disputes.63 In common law nations, law is also 
created when elected or appointed state and federal judges hand down 
their decisions. In contrast to legislation, such case-by-case 
adjudication produces law when courts adopt general principles to 
decide the outcome of individual future disputes.64 Top-down 
lawmaking is thus geared towards the future rather than current 
solutions. It is also widely considered to be “government driven.” 
Although some judges and experts consider common law to be a 
bottom-up solution as it derives from individuals—judges—who 
approach one problem at a time as it arises,65 this Article considers 
common law to be more typical of traditional top-down solutions 
since a limited range of powerful governmental actors—judges—
create this type of law without the input from civil society otherwise 
typical of modern bottom-up solutions. 
In the traditional top-down approach, international lawmaking 
typically centers on nation states adopting formal treaties or other 
binding instruments deriving from treaties. Such law is made by 
 
62 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Bottom-up Versus Top-Down Lawmaking, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 
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“elite” actors who are often relatively far removed both politically and 
geographically from the entire lawmaking process, but whose law is 
nonetheless imposed on those they govern.66 
There are many advantages of top-down solutions at both the 
national and supranational levels. For example, large government 
bodies typically have many more technical, financial, human, and 
other resources at their disposal than small actors, budgetary crises 
notwithstanding. With large resource pools come at least the potential 
for great competencies and deep expertise. Because of their traditional 
positions as lawmakers and enforcers, governments also typically 
enjoy the respect of civil society, at least in positive myth nations (see 
below). In democratic nations, there is little doubt about the validity 
of the actions taken at the national and supranational levels. And even 
if the general public is resentful towards their governments, the latter 
have powerful compliance methods at their disposal. Of course, the 
need for large-scale government action is recognized simply because 
civil society and small-scale actors can only do so much alone; there 
is quite a bit of natural interdependency between governments and the 
people they govern. 
However, legal change at the national and international levels often 
comes at a glacial place, if at all. It takes much momentum for nation 
states to develop new law at the international level and, as is seen 
with the treaty regime, often quite a bit of compromise as well. Often, 
otherwise innovative and good legal solutions perish or stall when 
nations either cannot agree on the fine details of the potential new 
instruments or refuse to ratify them. Thus, the traditional top-down 
regime is, for good reason, often considered too cumbersome and too 
unlikely to produce the desired results in short time. Examples 
abound of the ineffectiveness in relying exclusively on large-scale 
action to solve problems of pressing significance. For example, think 
climate change: the international community of nation states have 
agreed to make an attempt to hold the increase in global average 
temperature below 2º C above pre-industrial levels.67 To do so, GHG 
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emissions must be reduced drastically and urgently.68 Nonetheless, 
the parties to the UNFCCC most recently—at the December 2012 
Doha Conference of the Parties—only agreed to a decision stating the 
“importance” of adopting a legally binding instrument to replace the 
Kyoto Protocol by 2015 and indicating that this new treaty should 
come into effect in 2020.69 In reality, it is far from certain that the 
international community will be able to agree on a much further-
reaching agreement than the Kyoto Protocol over the course of a few 
years. In fact, the parties themselves have “noted with grave concern 
the significant gap between current national and international efforts 
to reduce emissions and those required by science to ensure a 
reasonable chance of holding global temperature increases below two 
or 1.5 degrees Celsius.”70 So whereas “[t]hese observations reflect a 
clear realization by both Parties and the scientific community that the 
level of ambition needs to be raised further,”71 it paradoxically seems 
that the global consensus on how to do so at the supranational level 
appears unlikely to come about in the near future, if at all. However, 
what may at first appear to be a paradox is arguably just simple 
international legal and socio-political reality, namely that effective 
climate change action is currently unlikely to result from large-scale 
action requiring a large number of nations with widely divergent 
national interests to reach a broadly applicable agreement. 
 
68 For example, the United Nations Environment Programme’s BRIDGING THE 
EMISSIONS GAP report states that to reach the 2º C goal, global anthropogenic emissions 
need to peak before 2020 and be reduced to approximately 44 GtCO2e by 2020. Id. at 9. 
However, total emissions at the end of 2009 were at 49.5 GtCO2e. Id. at 15. The report 
acknowledges that this presents “an emissions [problem] that urgently needs addressing.” 
Id. at 7. To create a likely chance of complying with the 2º C target in the long term, total 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2050 must be about 46% lower than their 1990 level, or about 
53% lower than their 2005 level. Id. at 9. See also Press Release, United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, History in the Making—The Inaugural 
Session of the ADP, May 2012, available at http://unfccc.int/press/news_room/ 
newsletter/items/6844.php [hereinafter History in the Making]. For position statements by 
major scientific institutes agreeing that significant human-caused climate change is 
occurring and needs to be redressed urgently, see The Scientific Consensus on Climate 
Change, WEATHER UNDERGROUND, http://www.wunderground.com/resources/climate/ 
928.asp (last visited Apr. 8, 2013). 
69 Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for 
Annex I Parties Under the Kyoto Protocol, Draft Decision, 8th Sess., Nov. 26, 2012–Dec. 
7, 2012, U.N. Doc. FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/L.9 (Dec. 8, 2012). 
70 History in the Making, supra note 68; BRIDGING THE EMISSIONS GAP, supra note 67, 
at 8 (“[S]cientists [have] reported that a gap was expected in 2020 between expected 
emissions and the global emissions consistent with the 2º C target, even if [voluntarily 
agreed-upon GHG reduction] pledges were implemented fully.”). 
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Similarly, European Union fishing quotas were designed to protect 
EU waters from overfishing, but after decades of discussions are still 
known to be “imperfect instruments” in dire need of change.72 And 
after years of international efforts to combat human trafficking, the 
number of child victims of human trafficking rose no less than 27% 
from 2008 to 2011.73 During the same period, adult human trafficking 
rose by 13%.74 In spite of the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) having been 
ratified by 175 members and thus being among the host of 
international conservation agreements that enjoy the largest 
membership,75 the annual trade in endangered animals worldwide is 
estimated to be worth USD 20 billion, trailing only guns and drugs on 
the illegal market and thus leading many countries to suggest that 
CITES has downright failed.76 
“Insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, but 
expecting different results.”77 Using the word “insanity” for 
attempting to instigate change through traditional channels is taking 
too much of a negative attitude towards large-scale action. In fact, 
using a range of different avenues including, but not limited to, top-
down solutions in the difficult quest it is to change serious national 
and transnational problems is very wise. But other venues have 
surfaced as equally or perhaps more effective. These will be 
examined next. 
B. “Bottom-up” Lawmaking 
Modernly, bottom-up solutions are often touted in legal scholarship 
to constitute more effective inroads on some of the most stubborn 
large-scale legal problems faced by society today than traditional top-
 
72 See, e.g., Eben Harrell, EU Discusses Fishing Quotas, TIME (Mar. 1, 2011), 
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down solutions. If not more effective, at least bottom-up solutions 
present viable additional methods of attacking a range of problems 
such as those often encountered the human rights and environmental 
fields. However, bottom-up lawmaking is not new. The concept can 
be traced to a classic scholarly article from 1961 that explained that a 
simple dichotomy between “the” government and “the” marketplace, 
each seen as one single unit, was not a good scientific approach to the 
study of public economies.78 Multiple actors were and are considered 
beneficial in not only economic, but also international environmental 
scholarship.79 
What makes bottom-up lawmaking and enforcement differ from 
top-down solutions is to a large extent that the former includes a 
diverse range of sub-state actors, mid-level technocrats, and, 
importantly, private parties and NGOs in addition to traditional 
government representatives.80 The actions of these parties coalesce 
around shared, on-the ground experiences and perceived self-
interests.81 They are often intended as self-regulation, at least at the 
initial stages of law formation.82 Bottom-up lawmaking can thus be 
considered to be a “subterranean, unchoreographed” process of local 
practice that eventually becomes law:83 
These actors’ “micro-decisions,” their day-in and day-out choices, 
are designed to navigate a myriad of on-the-ground exigencies and 
demands. Collectively, these “micro-decisions” assume normative 
significance, as decisions become norms and as norms at once 
reflect and condition future decisionmaking and practice. Over time, 
this patchwork of on-the-ground decisionmaking hardens as law, 
often embedding in a formal legal instrument (treaty, statute, 
contract, administrative regulation). Thus, whereas top-down 
international lawmaking is a process of laws internalized into day-
to-day practice, bottom-up lawmaking is a process whereby 
practices and behaviors are externalized as law.84 
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Two important aspects of the bottom-up lawmaking process are 
worth highlighting. First, the background and identity of participants 
in bottom-up lawmaking processes is broader than that of traditional 
“lawmakers.” Because the participants are linked to the “bottom” of 
traditional law-creation strata, state and national elites, diplomats, and 
politicians recede to the fringes.85 Instead, local public and private 
actors emerge as powerful drivers of change at the local level whether 
it be city, municipal, or a somewhat geographically larger, but still 
sub-national, level. “Private actors” cover both purely private 
individuals, but also, more typically, NGOs. In turn, these may be 
motivated by either altruism (in which case they are known as 
“Public-Interest NGOs” or “PINGOs”) or by profit (“Business-
Interest NGOs” or “BINGOs”). 
Second, the decisions of these actors are legally consequential as 
they trickle trough unusual channels before eventually becoming law 
of either national or even international significance. “While isolated 
‘practitioner’ decisions are not initially international ‘law’, according 
to a rather formal, narrow taxonomy, these decisions ultimately 
become law, either by embedding directly in formal legal instruments 
or by collectively placing pressure on and shaping legal outcomes.”86 
Accordingly, “through a process of bottom-up lawmaking, much 
international law surfaces.”87 
Bottom-up lawmaking can also be viewed as a “polycentric system 
of lawmaking rather than a monocentric hierarchy.”88 A polycentric 
order is one in which “many elements are capable of making mutual 
adjustments for ordering their relationships with one another within a 
general system of rules where each element acts with independence of 
other elements.”89 Complex problems, such as climate change, that 
involve difficult adaptive, multi-scalar institutional and social 
dynamics that evolve rapidly and constantly arguably demand 
polycentric approaches,90 as it is unrealistic to think that such 
problems can be solved through one channel only. 
The advantages of bottom-up, polycentric lawmaking are legion. 
First, inspiration by and involvement of those most highly affected by 
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on-the-ground effects of new legal decisions is of obvious 
importance. Second, local actors possess great knowledge of various 
local (and often niche) legal, trade, environmental, and other issues. 
By adding a second layer of research, contemplation and input before 
governments take action that has effect for years, local actors 
contribute to the knowledge production required in connection with 
the creation of law and policy in valuable ways. Similarly, civil 
society actors often possess great financial, technical, and legal 
resources as well as valuable contacts to local networks that they are 
likely to be willing to share with public authorities if this furthers 
their own causes. This can help governments save scarce resources. 
“By ‘utilizing the state for what it does best—raising resources and 
setting broad societal directions—while using nonprofit organizations 
for what they do best—delivering services at a human scale and 
innovating new fields—important public advantages can thus be 
gained.’”91 Polycentric solutions of course also involve local 
authorities such as cities. These authorities enjoy great legal powers 
regarding, for example, “building and other codes, zoning, and 
various proprietary powers that can lead to substantial influence when 
considered collectively.”92 
In addition to counteracting traditional top-down mandates that are 
often fixed, highly prescriptive, and inflexible—and thus considered 
inexpedient at the local level—law created from the bottom is more 
readily adaptable and thus better suited to unanticipated and complex 
contexts.93 However, the state still plays an active role in this context. 
This role becomes not only more effective, but also more legitimate 
when a wide range of stakeholders is involved in the regulatory 
process.94 “[O]pening up the policymaking process to public 
consultation discussing where resources should better be used, 
increases the legitimacy of the regulating process and shares 
responsibilities over the final outcomes.”95 In other words, the 
regulated can be said to become regulators through bottom-up and 
public participation provisions. Diverse approaches such as those 
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involving polycentric models and local actors stimulate and diffuse 
innovation,96 which results in greater potential for solutions that a 
narrower range of actors simply may not create. 
Citizen participation and the public pressure it creates are known to 
further create an incentive structure for the formulation of effective 
regulatory structures at the national level.97 For example, local actors 
help create new social norms that eventually harden into law from the 
bottom, but they also contribute to the creation of top-down law when 
demands for action are moved from local to national government 
levels via lobbyism and other privately driven action. Thus, NGOs 
have resurfaced as transnational “norm entrepreneurs”98 in helping to 
shape both domestic law (for example, the juvenile death penalty in 
the United States) and by adding a voice to international law 
formation and enforcement (as with CEDAW in San Francisco, which 
will be explained further below). 
The local/national interface is also significant given what may be 
referred to as the “paradox of the lent targets.”99 According to this, it 
is local governments and other actors that are the main implementing 
bodies of, for example, legally binding agreements such as the Kyoto 
Protocol under which national governments are held responsible for 
meeting the targets. It is thus an advantage to involve local actors in 
the lawmaking process as early and as much as possible. Conversely, 
national governments alone cannot and do not act in a vacuum; they 
need the support of their constituents at all scales, including that of 
civil society. Sub-national actors should, for example, be included in 
the next possible climate change treaty regime.100 
When it comes to the relevance of localized action to the global 
commons, an earlier widespread theoretical presumption was that 
only large-scale action was relevant for policies related to global 
public goods.101 However, research has shown that small and 
medium-scale units are also necessary components in this particular 
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field.102 “An important lesson is that simply recommending a single 
governmental unit to solve global collective action problems—
because of global impacts—needs to be seriously rethought and the 
important role of smaller-scale effects recognized.103 “[W]aiting for 
effective policies to be established at the global level is 
unreasonable.”104 Even very small-scale action may be fruitful; for 
example, psychological research similarly supports the notion that 
involving groups of private actors in attempting to combat climate 
change can play an important role in fostering attitude and behavioral 
change at a broader scale as well.105 Local governments play an 
important role in this aspect too: because of their sheer proximity 
(both geographically and communicatively) to residents in their 
jurisdictions, they enjoy unique potential to influence civil society’s 
actions despite their subjection to state and federal law.106 
Finally, if traditional legal systems fail in regards to climate change 
or other problems of national and international significance, society 
will, through localized action, have developed the skills, social norms, 
and community connections to better manage adaptation situations 
better.107 Important social capital will have been built.108 At the very 
least, involving civil society in norm-creation that will affect 
everyone one way or another is an ethical advantage.109 
Of course, bottom-up law making is no panacea; vulnerabilities 
exist in relation to this scheme as well. For example, the need for state 
and other scaled-up action is recognized in relation to issues that local 
actors simply cannot solve on their own. This holds true where 
national and supranational action is required as in the adoption, 
ratification, and national implementation of treaties. One important 
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example of this is possible future versions of the now-expired Kyoto 
Protocol. Just as governments need the support of their constituents as 
described above, so do local actors need their state and national 
governments to act. The interdependency between governments and 
people is simply a fact of life with which we have to contend in the 
creation of new law and legal regimes. 
Another negative is that polycentric models have to contend with 
the risk of regulatory fragmentation and the resulting inefficiency and 
inaction.110 For example, “[c]ommentators have fingered a 
fragmented natural resources management structure in the United 
States as the culprit behind agency inaction, a lack of interagency 
learning, and neglect of climate change issues.”111 Similarly, weak 
ties between local actors and government officials have already been 
shown to hamper effective action in relation to climate change in one 
major city in the United States.112 
A typical criticism directed at current efforts to reduce GHG 
emissions in particular is that “too many projects and activities are 
operating at multiple scales and that the system is chaotic.”113 For 
example, some projects have been accused of “rewarding actors who 
are not genuinely interested in reducing the threat of climate change 
but are instead looking for opportunities to gain funds and search for 
minimal ways of meeting project objectives.”114 Other projects are 
known to create “perverse incentives”—as when land-use regulations 
result in higher timber prices—but are poorly enforced, resulting in 
additional incentives for clearing forests.115 But importantly, 
scholarship does not show that these and other attempts to “game” the 
system are products only when action is instigated at multiple levels 
or by multiple actors. Making this argument would fly in the face of 
logic. Throughout history, seeking out advantages for oneself has 
been common, even when doing so violates either the letter or the 
spirit of the law in question. 
In short, this Article takes the view that there are more and more 
significant advantages of bottom-up lawmaking than there are 
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disadvantages, especially when it comes to technically and 
scientifically complex social issues. 
C. Aarhus Convention 
An example of how these and other advantages of involving civil 
society and local actors in lawmaking and enforcement have been 
recognized in a legal instrument is the UNECE Convention on Access 
to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access 
to Justice in Environmental Matters adopted in Aarhus, Denmark, in 
1998 (the Aarhus Convention, or the Convention). This calls for 
ratifying parties to guarantee the rights of access to information, to 
access to justice in environmental matters, and to public participation 
in decision-making.116 The importance of these procedural rights can 
be traced to Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, which states that 
[e]nvironmental issues are best handled with the participation of all 
concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, each 
individual shall have appropriate access to information concerning 
the environment that is held by public authorities . . . and the 
opportunity to participate in decision-making processes. States shall 
facilitate and encourage public awareness and participation by 
making information widely available.117 
The Aarhus Convention is the first multilateral environmental 
agreement (MEA) that focuses exclusively on the obligations of states 
towards their citizens, and thus not only on parties’ rights and 
obligations vis-à-vis each other.118 Among other unique aspects, the 
Convention encourages parties to actively involve civil society in a 
number of meaningful ways in relation to decision-making processes 
before substantive legal decisions are made. The Convention also 
seeks to involve the general public in the enforcement of at least the 
Convention itself. For example, it allows members of the general 
public to make communications to the Compliance Committee 
 
116 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters art. 1, June 25, 1998, Aarhus, Denmark, 
available at http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf 
[hereinafter Aarhus Convention]. 
117 Conference on Environment and Development, U.N. June 3–14, 1992, Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I) 
(Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], available at http://www.un.org/documents 
/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm. 
118 Ole W. Pedersen, European Environmental Human Rights and Environmental 
Rights: A Long Time Coming?, 21 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 73, 92–94 (2008). 
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concerning a Party’s compliance with the Convention.119 Other 
treaties typically only allow nation states to do so. Further, NGOs 
may nominate candidates for election to the Compliance Committee, 
also a unique participatory step in treaty contexts.120 The Compliance 
Committee has taken the lead among international agreements in 
opening its own meetings to observers, including those from the non-
governmental sector.121 
As an international instrument, the Convention addresses only 
procedural provisions of the law. Accordingly, it does not speak to 
how nations should develop their substantive environmental laws. 
Nonetheless, the Convention has the potential to lead to substantively 
improved laws as well.122 This is mainly so because procedural 
provisions serve as a guarantee of the right to have an underlying 
substantive right adjudicated with the potential for the expansion 
upon substantive rights through adjudication.123 It is exactly through 
its procedural provisions that the Aarhus Convention is recognized to 
have “the potential to facilitate the same outcome as a substantive 
right in terms of assisting citizens in enforcing and pursuing 
environmental norms.”124 Public participation is an important 
stepping-stone on the way to more informed and thus better 
substantive decision-making. It is also a method of not passively 
relying on lawmakers to live up to their democratic promises, but also 
actively making them aware of the necessity to make environmentally 
sound decisions.125 In short, procedural provisions have the potential 
for assisting in avoiding poorly founded “ivory tower decisions.”126  
The Aarhus Convention principles are relevant to the development of 
both national and international law. 
 
119 Background, U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ccback 
ground.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
120 U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., Report of the First Meeting of the Parties: Decision 
I/7 on Review of Compliance, Annex ¶ 18, U.N. Doc. ECE/MP.PP/2/Add 8 (Apr. 2, 2004). 
121 NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: EFFICIENCY IN FLEXIBILITY? 152 (Pierre-Marie 
Dupuy & Luisa Vierucci eds., 2008). 
122 See Dellinger, supra note 109. 
123 Id. 
124 Pedersen, supra note 118, at 92, 108. 
125 See Dellinger, supra note 109. 
126 Id. at 335. 
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III 
WHY LAW IS OBSERVED 
As legal practitioners and scholars, we tend to center our thinking 
on purely legal solutions to a host of societal problems.127 However, 
most of us probably rarely stop to ponder exactly why law has the 
importance to society that it does. This section describes some of the 
main reasons why people observe the law at all. The purpose of this is 
to demonstrate that motivating factors which may not immediately 
come to mind bear as much weight as traditional motivators, if not 
more. 
Traditional thinking dictates that people follow the law for fear of 
financial and other punitive deterrents or because they seek 
compliance incentives, most often of a financial nature. Under this 
homo economicus theory, people do not worry about morality, ethics, 
or other people, but instead act selfishly and opportunistically in order 
to pursue the course of action that brings them the greatest material 
advantage.128 A follower of this school of thought, former Chief 
Justice Holmes of the United States Supreme Court, commented on 
what he saw as the folly of connecting law with morality more than a 
century ago in what later became known as the “bad man” notion of 
law:129 
If you want to know the law . . . you must look at it as a bad man, 
who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge allows him to predict, and not as a good one, who finds 
his reason for conduct . . . in the vague sanctions of conscience. . . . 
[W]hat does it mean to a bad man? Mainly, and in the first place, a 
prophecy that if he does certain things he will be subjected to 
disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or compulsory 
payment of money.130 
More than a century later, Holmes’ “bad man” thesis is still 
routinely accepted by academics, lawyers, policymakers, regulators, 
and judges as a truth that does not require examination.131 This way of 
thinking has dominated public policy and many private institutions as 
 
127 Undoubtedly, financial motivations and disincentives carry great weight as well, but 
as those appear to have taken a backseat in much of climate change law, they will not be 
discussed in any detail here. 
128 STOUT, supra note 22, at 4. 
129 Id. at 24. 
130 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–61 
(1897). 
131 STOUT, supra note 22, at 39–40. 
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well.132 Contemporary experts trained in law and politics tend to not 
notice unselfish, pro-social behavior.133 But this situation is changing 
for the better. An understanding is developing that there are many 
more subtle ways in which legal rules influence behavior and that 
pure conscience plays a large role as well.134 Thus, it is not only 
judgments about the certainty and severity of official retaliation that 
drive our actions; informal sanctions and disapproval by our peers 
weigh on our consciousness too.135 As noted by Eric Posner, “people 
appear to obey norms both in order to avoid being sanctioned by 
others (‘shame’) and in order to avoid being sanctioned by their own 
conscience (‘guilt’).”136 Personal morality and social values play an 
equally important role. In fact, modern studies show that experts 
trained in law “greatly overestimate” the incidence of selfish 
behavior, and “seriously underestimate” the role conscience plays in 
directing human behavior and the extent to which we act for unselfish 
reasons.137 It is now recognized that we follow social norms not only 
out of concern for our reputations or fear of retaliation, but also 
because we think we ought to.138 Our capacity to act unselfishly is an 
advantage in and of itself, but even knowing that some people act 
unselfishly influences the behavior of even the purely selfish.139 Such 
“‘second-order effects’ allow a large number of small, marginally 
unselfish behaviors to support and reinforce prosociality.”140 This can 
be harnessed in disciplines such as human rights and environmental 
law where monetary/selfish interests have played a relatively large 
role in decision-shaping so far, but where more altruistic concerns 
would help develop the law in more equitable ways for the future. 
 
132 Id. at 40. 
133 Id. at 44. 
134 STOUT, supra note 22, at 40, 71. 
135 TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 42 (2006). 
136 Eric Posner, Efficient Norms, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 
AND THE LAW 2:20 (Peter Edman ed., 1998). 
137 STOUT, supra note 22, at 70–71. 
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into harness.” Id. at 36. 
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The mere existence of laws leads many people to self-enforce 
based on “practical authority.”141 Practical authority drives people to 
follow the laws even where enforcement is unlikely.142 For example, a 
person follows practical authority when, with no other cars near, she 
waits at a red light very late at night.143 Similarly, the symbolic 
importance of laws is crucial to many. For this reason, laws may, 
paradoxically, be considered necessary even though they are not 
obeyed by many, are largely unenforced and unenforceable, and are 
argued by some to do as much harm as good.144 An example of this is 
laws against drugs.145 “‘They’re good,’ people say, ‘because they 
make a statement. They express the norms of civilized society.’”146 
This is so even though drug problems continue to exist in spite of 
years of broad illegality. The fact that most individuals still respect 
laws because of their symbolic existence despite, perhaps, any actual 
effect differs strikingly from previous self-interest models that still, 
but erroneously, dominate current thinking in law, political science, 
and sociology.147 Finally, religious reasons continue to be important 
to the observance of law to many.148 
However, it is also important to note that people only obey laws 
they truly believe in: 
People don’t obey laws that they don’t believe in. It isn’t 
necessarily that they behave lawlessly, or that they’ll steal whatever 
they can steal if they think they can get away with it. Most people 
try to comply, at least substantially, with what they believe the law 
to say. If they don’t believe the law says what it in fact says, 
though, they won’t obey it—not because they are protesting its 
provisions, but because it doesn’t stick in their heads. Governments 
stop enforcing laws that people don’t believe in. Laws that people 
 
141 Crystal R. Dawson, Life in the Smoky Lane: An Evaluation of Environmental 
Tobacco Smoke and Bans on Smoking in Vehicles Containing Children, 4 PHOENIX L. 
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143 Id. 
144 Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (Or Why We Can’t “Just Say Yes” to 
Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 237, 240 (1997). 
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147 TYLER, supra note 135, at 178. 
148 See, e.g., Intisar A. Rabb, The Islamic Rule of Lenity: Judicial Discretion and Legal 
Canons, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1299, 1315 (2011) (“Muslims conceived of God as 
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Muslim theologians and jurists had a relatively straightforward answer to the positivist 
question of why people should follow the law: religious texts—namely the Qur’ān and 
prophetic edicts—required it.”). 
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don’t obey and that governments don’t enforce get repealed, even if 
they are good laws in some other sense of the word.149 
Examples of such laws are the now-repealed national fifty-five-
miles-per-hour speed limit, laws prohibiting consensual sodomy, or 
laws that prohibit minors from buying cigarettes.150 
It is thus not correct that people are primarily motivated by short-
term interests that can be addressed via compliance or deterrence 
factors.151 Accordingly, “[t]o understand and use law more 
effectively, we must take account of the many ways law changes 
behavior, above and beyond creating material incentives”152 or 
through traditional legal deterrents. 
The above considerations have been made about the effect of law 
in “positive myth” countries. Countries can also be categorized into 
“negative myth” countries:153 
Individuals in societies with a “positive myth of law” tend to think 
that other people usually follow the law; that the law is a good thing 
and provides a fair way to resolve disputes; and that to break the 
law is “socially disgraceful.” In contrast, individuals in societies 
with a “negative myth of law” tend to think that everyone else is 
regularly ignoring or breaking the law. “Negative myth” countries 
also have high levels of distrust in officials and government 
bureaucracy.154 
Examples of “negative myth” countries include Russia, Ukraine, 
and Armenia.155 The challenge in these countries is that “people tend 
to see law as simply a game, and as something to work around or 
over, not to simply follow.”156 
By and large, people will interpret their observations about the law 
on the basis of deeply rooted understandings of how the law works or 
does not work.157 “This means that even if there is change in the 
formal justice system, people are likely to view these changes, at least 
initially, with great skepticism and cynicism.”158 In contrast to 
positive myth countries, people in negative myth countries tend to put 
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a negative spin even on positive examples of how the law actually 
might work well or how government leaders may be following it.159 
This, of course, presents an additional hurdle to any change of law in 
negative myth nations. 
In contrast, people support authorities when they feel that their 
interests are being furthered by governments that perform quality 
work.160 People who regard legal authorities as legitimate are found to 
comply with the law more frequently.161 This presumably holds true 
in “negative myth” countries as well. In other words, procedure is of 
crucial importance to creating a good normative climate for decision-
making and enforcement: 
People may believe specific decisions are wrong, even 
wrongheaded, and individual judges unworthy of their offices and 
still continue to support the court if they respect it as an institution 
that is generally impartial, just and competent . . . [certain people] 
often regard the way in which they are treated by governmental 
institutions as at least as important as the extent to which they 
achieve their substantive goals. It is being unfairly treated that 
disrupts the relationship of legitimacy to compliance, not receiving 
poor outcomes.162 
The important element in this context is to take steps to make 
people feel that they had an opportunity to take a meaningful part in 
the decision-making process, including having an opportunity to 
present their views, to be heard, and to have their views considered by 
the authorities.163 “People who feel that they have had a hand in the 
decision are typically much more accepting of its outcome, 
irrespective of what the outcome is.”164 
In positive rule of law myth countries, scholars have found that 
procedural justice contributes to legitimacy. The studies on 
procedural justice have found that, for purposes of legitimacy, the 
process is more important to people than the outcome. If people find 
the process was fair or just, then they are more satisfied with the 
system than if they do not. Procedural justice scholarship examined 
underlying attitudes and views about the legal process and 
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160 TYLER, supra note 135, at 50. 
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concluded that people think that a dispute resolution process was 
fair if the following key factors were present: that they were able to 
speak and be heard; that they were treated with dignity; and that the 
authority or decision-maker was neutral and fair.165 
An example of how these concerns are promoted at the 
international level is the Aarhus Convention described above. 
In short: people obey the law if it is legitimate, plausible, morally 
sound, expedient seen from a societal point of view, and if it has been 
reached in procedurally proper ways.166 
IV 
THE INTERSECTION BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
New direction needs to be taken in both human rights and 
environmental law. This Article argues that bottom-up approaches 
present a viable and expedient alternative to traditional lawmaking 
when the two areas intersect. However, for this theory to be 
applicable, the two areas of law must share some common 
denominators. Were this not the case, using shared approaches would 
be unsound and illogical. This section shows how several 
commonalities exist and how environmental issues are already 
enhanced and enforced through a human rights approach. 
As a threshold matter, human rights are “rights inherent to all 
human beings, whatever our nationality, place of residence, sex, 
national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, or any other 
status. We are all equally entitled to our human rights without 
discrimination. These rights are all interrelated, interdependent and 
indivisible.”167 Further, they are inalienable and universal.168 It is thus 
“the duty of States to promote and protect all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, regardless of their political, economic and 
cultural systems.”169 
 
165 Alkon, supra note 153 at 173–74. 
166 TYLER, supra note 135, at 178. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 9, 2013). 
168 Id. 
169 Id. 
2013] An Unstoppable Tide: Creating Environmental 95 
and Human Rights Law from the Bottom Up 
Among frequently recognized substantive human rights are the 
right to life;170 freedom from arbitrary interference in private or 
family life;171 the right to property;172 freedom from torture173 and 
slavery;174 the right to a fair trial;175 and the freedom of speech,176 
thought, conscience and religion.177 Non-discrimination is another 
significant principle in human rights law.178 Of course, newer 
considerations get added to the international human rights regime 
over time as the human knowledge and our socio-ethical 
considerations evolve. For example, in 1997, UNESCO179 adopted the 
Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generation 
Towards the Future Generations, the preamble of which recognizes 
that “at this point in history, the very existence of humankind and its 
environment are threatened.”180 The Declaration goes on to call for 
the protection of the environment by undertaking, inter alia, 
sustainable development, pollution prevention, and preserving natural 
resources needed for future generations.181 In November 2002, the 
United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
issued a non-binding comment affirming, for the first time, that access 
to water was a human right and not a mere commodity to be bought 
and sold.182 
 
170 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6.1, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
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Whereas the right to a healthy or adequate environment has been 
considered a human right in its own right,183 the most common way of 
linking environmental rights to the human rights umbrella is, 
however, still to consider environmental rights to stem from what 
may be seen as “traditional” human rights. The link between the two 
areas has been officially recognized this way. For example, regional 
human rights bodies such as the African Commission on Human 
Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights have associated the right to 
life with the right to a healthy environment.184 In a 1994 report, U.N. 
Special Rapporteur Fatma Z. Ksentini similarly formulated strong 
links between environmental protection and the fundamental human 
rights to life, health, and culture.185 In a 2008 resolution, the U.N. 
Human Rights Council further emphasized the fact that “climate 
change poses an immediate and far-reaching threat to people and 
communities around the world and has implications for the full 
enjoyment of human rights.”186 The Aarhus Convention similarly 
recognizes the “right of every person of present and future 
generations to live in an environment adequate to his or her health and 
well-being.187 The European Convention on Human Rights considers 
threats to the environment to fall under the umbrella of rights to 
private and family life.188 Landmark human rights cases have also 
upheld the link between environmentally adverse actions and the 
rights to private and family life.189 The Supreme Courts of India, the 
Philippines, and Montana, as well as trial courts in Nigeria, have all 
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applied substantive environmental human rights claims to the 
resolution of cases.190 Finally, fair trade considerations regarding 
coffee and other agricultural products as well as the occasionally 
controversial operations of large multinational oil companies in the 
Global South also demonstrate how human rights and environmental 
law intersect both in theory and application. 
As demonstrated, there are thus several recognized links between 
“traditional” human rights and “environmental human rights.” A 
common platform for the development of both areas of law separately 
and for the development of environmental law through a human rights 
approach thus exists. On this foundation, the remainder of the Article 
will examine how five select metropolises have developed their 
human rights and/or environmental law schemes from the bottom-up 
and what lessons can be learned from these experiments. 
V 
A TALE OF FIVE CITIES: BOTTOM-UP, POLYCENTRIC 
APPROACHES TO LAW DEVELOPMENT 
A. San Francisco Human Rights Law: International Inspiration 
Leads to Local Action 
In 1998, San Francisco became the first, and still only, U.S. city to 
adopt a local ordinance reflecting the principles of the Convention on 
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW).191 CEDAW is often described as an international bill of 
rights for women.192 Consisting of a preamble and thirty articles, it 
sets up an agenda for national action to end discrimination against 
women defined as 
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex 
which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the 
recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human 
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191 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women: 
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rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural, civil or any other field.193 
The history of and ongoing CEDAW work in San Francisco 
demonstrates how international principles can become legally binding 
at the local level even if no action is taken at the national level. 
Further, the San Francisco CEDAW experience shows how public 
participation does not require an initial mandate or other impetus from 
“above”; civil society can speak so loudly and effectively that 
governments choose to listen and act. San Francisco serves as an 
example of how community deliberation and critical involvement by 
NGOs can stand at the forefront of new governance models. 
Inspired by a 1995 United Nations (UN) World Conference on 
Women and frustrated by the continued inability to have the United 
States Congress ratify the UN version of CEDAW, the women of San 
Francisco organized a successful effort to have the city adopt a local 
ordinance reflecting CEDAW principles in 1998.194 These women 
organized under a coalition of local, national, and international NGOs 
such as Amnesty International USA, the Women’s Foundation of San 
Francisco, and the Women’s Institute for Leadership Development for 
Human Rights (WILD).195 Spearheaded by WILD, this coalition was 
in charge of the process of educating community members about the 
San Francisco version of CEDAW (hereinafter, “CEDAW” will only 
refer to the San Francisco ordinance) and gaining support for its local 
adoption.196 The consortium of NGOs was subsequently joined by and 
closely cooperated with the San Francisco Commission on the Status 
of Women (COSW), the San Francisco Human Rights Commission, 
and the County Board of Supervisors, which is the local legislative 
branch.197 The ordinance itself was drafted by COSW, the Office of 
the San Francisco Board of Supervisors President, and the City 
Attorney, and was enacted after a series of public hearings.198 Behind 
the passage of the ordinance were four primary motivators: 
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1. to demonstrate to federal officials how critical CEDAW is to 
women in the United States; 
2. to help bring women’s issues under the rubric of human rights; 
3. to bring the weight of international human rights into local 
communities; and 
4. to provide communities with a proactive rather than a retroactive 
strategy to promote change.199 
CEDAW addresses “second-generation” discrimination in the city 
(and thus county) of San Francisco.200 “First-generation” 
discrimination was the “deliberate exclusion or marginalization 
because of race, ethnicity, national origin, sex, age, religion, sexual 
orientation, or disability.”201 In contrast, second-generation 
discrimination involves “structures of decision-making, patterns of 
interaction, and cultural norms that are not immediately discernible at 
the level of the individual.”202 
To prevent or alleviate discrimination, San Francisco has 
implemented several innovative programs. Two examples are the 
Gender Analysis Tool (Tool) and “gender responsive budgeting” 
(GRB). The Tool sets forth a framework for analyzing the cultural, 
economic, social, civil, legal, and political relations between women 
and men203 in order to assist the city in implementing CEDAW 
principles. In a five-step process, the Tool requires city departments 
to analyze their operations for possible patterns of gender, race, and 
other identities in areas such as who is being served, hired, or 
awarded funds.204 It also asks the departments to address the impact of 
possibly discriminatory measures on city services, employment 
practices, and budget allocations.205 GRB requires city representatives 
to “review[] budget allocations for biases that can arise because a 
person is male or female, and considers disadvantage suffered as a 
result of ethnicity, poverty status, immigration, disability, age, or 
other demographic characteristics.”206 In an attempt to create 
 
199 Id. at 778 (emphasis added). 
200 Id. at 771. 
201 Id. 
202 Id. 
203 Id. at 781. 
204 MENON, supra note 194, at 3. The five steps are: Define Vision and Desired 
Outcomes; Collect and Analyze Data; Develop Options; Prioritize Strategies and Create an 
Action Plan; and Develop a Monitoring Mechanism. Id. at 3–4. 
205 Id. at 3. 
206 Id. at 8. 
100 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15, 63 
synergism between local government innovation and private action, 
the city is working towards having the private sector implement GRB 
as well.207 Similarly, the Department on the Status of Women works 
with the Calvert Group, “one of the largest families of socially 
responsible mutual funds in the United States,” and Verité, an 
international labor and human rights monitoring organization, in 
promoting the San Francisco Gender Equality Principles (GEP) 
Initiative.208 This latter government-based initiative provides private 
companies with practical tools for use in improving gender equality at 
all corporate levels.209 
San Francisco uses collaborative governance in other ways as well. 
For example, a task force composed of both governmental and non-
governmental representatives has been established to monitor the 
implementation of the ordinance pursuant to the ordinance itself.210 
Further, policy bodies meet regularly and in public to maximize 
transparency and public input.211 In short, public participation forms 
an official part of the local legal framework. 
Just as the creation of CEDAW in San Francisco was untraditional, 
so is the enforcement of the ordinance, at least seen from a traditional 
“hard law” point of view. The ordinance seeks to secure compliance 
through reporting, monitoring, and capacity building (“collaborative 
enforcement”), but features no “coercive enforcement.”212 The only 
type of traditional law enforcement under CEDAW is the city’s 
subpoena power, which can be used to require participation in 
information gathering regarding possible violations.213 Otherwise, the 
normative model is “premised upon the ‘persuasive power of 
legitimate legal obligations.’”214 Stakeholders are motivated by the 
internalization of rules and norms over time as they participate in 
deliberations and developments of the regime in what is locally 
considered to be legally and socially expedient ways. Thus, the 
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stakeholders are not “coerced”215 by anticipation of a more 
traditional-style top-down enforcement methodology. Thus, the San 
Francisco enforcement model mirrors the United Nations human 
rights regime upon which the ordinance is based in that it does not 
compel city agencies to follow up on their action plans but—through 
monitoring and reporting—seeks to shape behaviors and norms of 
participants in the problem-solving process216 via positive motivation. 
The advantages of cooperative rather than traditional enforcement-
based compliance are, among other factors, that participants may feel 
more free to share information—even that which appears to reflect on 
them in negative ways—with government agencies without fear of 
being sanctioned. In other words, in models with traditional “hard” 
enforcement, actors may withhold information that could lead to them 
being sanctioned where information-sharing would otherwise be 
fruitful seen from the ultimate viewpoint of reaching the substantive 
goals of the instrument in question. An example of such a “perverse 
incentive” will be seen in connection with the New York human 
rights system below. Cooperative enforcement styles rather than 
coercive ones are also promoted by and applied under international 
agreements such as the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Aarhus 
Convention. 
Typical criticism of collaborative enforcement is that some degree 
of rule enforcement is needed, for example, in cases of refusals to 
remedy flagrant violations of the law and the appurtenant 
compensation of victims.217 Further, critics note that difficulties 
relating to experiments in participatory problem solving, such as 
resistance to modern decision-making processes and the failure to 
institutionalize changed practices, are potentially exacerbated when 
the legislation developed does not explicitly provide for an 
enforcement mechanism.218 These concerns should be noted by future 
policymakers and legal scholars. However, this Article will proceed 
under the view that although collaborative enforcement may at first 
blush seem “toothless,” it does present the significant and recognized 
advantage that if we as civil society are to form a meaningful, active 
part of iterative norm-making processes, we will be more likely to 
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down, coercive enforcement to begin with. In other words, this 
“carrot-instead-of-stick” method is more procedurally sound and 
presents a better potential for substantive results as well. 
What results have been obtained by the San Francisco action? As a 
threshold matter, it is important to remember that whereas identifying 
procedurally improved methods can be relatively straightforward, 
distinguishing between the cause and effect in relation to any 
substantive results in this area is difficult. If, for example, it were 
possible to show that public or private actors have become “less 
discriminatory” than before, it would still be next to impossible to 
verify whether this was because of CEDAW per se or, rather, because 
the thinking of such actors has evolved in positive ways for other 
reasons instead or as well. Nonetheless, some on-the-ground patterns 
indicate at least some degree of both procedural and substantive 
success just as the attitude held by competencies and stakeholders in 
San Francisco has improved positively. First, the City Charter was 
changed by referendum in 2008 to encourage the appointment of 
more women, minorities, and people with disabilities.219 While 
discrimination undoubtedly still exists in San Francisco, and while it 
appears that some agencies have merely chosen to add services rather 
than to affirmatively change their practices,220 a new awareness of 
gender-related issues among agencies has, however, been 
pinpointed.221 These agencies have “uniformly appreciated the human 
rights pro-active application as being more effective than the reactive 
discriminatory complaint-driven approach.”222 Department personnel 
have also, in large, been receptive to the gender analysis methodology 
and, on their own initiative rather than because of top-down 
mandates, began evaluating their programs for any possibly existing 
discrimination.223 Other indicia of success are that a dedicated “Girls 
Unit” was created at Juvenile Hall after the adoption of CEDAW,224 
just as the findings about discrimination within the Department of the 
Environment greatly influenced the establishment of the 
Department’s policies and procedures, which now form a permanent 
part of the Department operations.225 Thus, several procedurally 
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sound results exist. These “bel[y] traditional criticisms of 
collaborative governance, successfully linking aspirational standards 
to a system of problem solving by granting specificity to general 
norms, creating a dynamic system of collaboration between 
nonprofits and local government, and using formal law to legitimate 
informal law.”226 
Substantive results are, as mentioned, harder to trace to CEDAW in 
particular, just as it would be outside the scope of this Article to go in 
depth with such results. The author’s research into city documentation 
thus only discloses that any possibly related results appear to range 
from relatively modest to good. For example, when it comes to the 
retention of a diverse workforce, the city’s materials show that before 
CEDAW, women held 33% of professional positions although the 
available labor pool of women was 48%.227 One person of color held 
a professional level position.228 Now, 69% are women and 39% are 
“minorities.”229 The percentage of women members of commissions 
and boards also rose from forty-eight to fifty-one from 2007 to 
2011,230 but the author was not able to identify corresponding “before 
and after” figures for minority membership of commissions and 
boards. 
San Francisco presents a good example of how international law 
can become “localized” if seen as important enough to bypass the 
lack of federal-level action. The interaction among government 
agencies, PINGOs, and BINGOs resulted in a highly iterative process 
in which an international instrument was interpreted and became 
successfully internalized into domestic law. International law is thus 
far from always the mere creation of law in a relatively formal, static 
process at the national or supranational level, but rather, can also be 
an evolutionary process resulting in legally binding action at the sub-
national level. This evolutionary process has been recognized to lead 
to locally more relevant and more democratically accepted law. 
Although arguably difficult to achieve, a more participatory localized 
approach to the adoption of international treaty principles can thus be 
a boon to society. This process is not unlike the localization of, for 
example, languages. This also requires considerable creativity, 
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consideration of the consequences of the written word, addition of 
crucial aspects of what is to be conveyed, and the omission of others, 
rather than the mere re-creation of text. Some aspects of both 
language and law are, in fact, impossible to emulate locally whereas 
others are not necessary. When some aspects are added, the original 
source is enhanced. 
Through a more participatory approach to the adoption of 
international treaty principles, the dichotomy between what is often 
seen as the “core” of international law and its “periphery” becomes, if 
not erased, at least undermined.231 This is a positive: breaking down 
traditional, rigid barriers presents new opportunities for legal growth. 
Further, the participatory approach constitutes an example of 
democracy at work in indirect, yet positive, ways; for example, the 
United States is the only industrialized nation in the world that has yet 
to ratify CEDAW.232 Nonetheless, through the steps mentioned above, 
civil society managed, through a longer path than in more “treaty-
friendly” countries, to reach the same ultimate goal,233 namely the 
adoption of the substantive principles of law, albeit in a local version. 
Government-level resistance towards the ratification of popular 
treaties may be perceived to be a failure of our democracy at work.234 
However, the San Francisco experience shows that this perception is 
not correct. The experience exemplifies how democracy is redefining 
itself in the United States: where scaled-up action is not forthcoming 
at the national level, scaled-down action takes over by civil society 
taking hitherto unforeseen paths towards desirable legal developments 
in cooperation with local governments. 
This, however, may present a problem of constitutional 
significance: the United States Constitution assigns the power to 
make and adopt treaties to the federal government, but when state and 
local governments “adopt” human rights treaties and other 
international norms in response to constituent pressures that are more 
effectively mobilized at the subnational level,235 the balance between 
federal and state powers may be disturbed. This is likely to be of 
concern to elected and potential lawmakers at the national and the 
sub-national levels. To be sure, localized action with potential 
national or even international ramifications invites dialogue about 
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who is better situated to take action: national or sub-national actors. 
Both have an important role to play. To solve complex legal 
problems, decisions have to be taken at multiple scales, just as state 
and federal actors have overlapping jurisdictions in relation to several 
legal issues such as environmental law. This implies the emerging 
theory of Dynamic Federalism under which 
“federal and state [and thus also local] governments function as 
alternative centers of power and any matter is presumptively within 
the authority of both the federal and state governments.”. . . 
Scholars of Dynamic Federalism reject the “minimal overlap” 
model in which there is a “particular allocation of at least primary 
regulatory authority between the states and the federal 
government,” replacing it with one “in which multiple levels of 
government interact in the regulatory process.” As a result, 
Dynamic Federalism “reject[s] the traditional state optimization 
model for an adaptive one.”236 
Such dialogic federalism is considered desirable by many “as 
opportunities for negotiation and dialogue can provide a means to 
clarify, articulate and convert abstract international human rights and 
other norms into concrete, practical, and democratically accepted 
domestic laws and policies.”237 It may thus be that instead of today’s 
heavy focus on states’ rights versus federal rights, we as a society will 
eventually have to accept a mixed approach to lawmaking, including 
law with an international impetus. This is so because unstoppable 
action is, as shown, springing up at the local level regardless of the 
federalism concerns of some. Modernly, “[w]ith the ‘disaggregation’ 
of sovereignty, permeability of national borders, and ascendancy of 
transnational civil society, it is hardly surprising that international 
human rights law seeps into our national legal culture through 
multiple points of entry.”238 
Just as international instruments and other legal inspiration can 
have sub-national implications, so can sub-national action eventually 
lead back to the international level as demonstrated by the San 
Francisco CEDAW development. Taking the lead from San 
Francisco, forty-five nations have now undertaken gender responsive 
budgeting initiatives at the national and/or sub-national levels of 
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government.239 The Gender Equality Principles were, in part, based on 
global women’s principles developed by the UN Global Compact and 
UNIFEM, but were further developed in San Francisco. The resulting 
seven aspirational principles now help companies around the world 
achieve greater gender equality.240 The principles have also 
influenced work performed by the World Bank Group, the Global 
Reporting Initiative, and the International Finance Corporation.241 
Thus, knowledge and experience gained at the local level can help 
frame and redefine not only actual on-the-ground steps at the local 
level, but also help frame and redefine the discourse and eventually 
development of international law and other action. The circle 
becomes full when sub-national experiments and discourse take 
direction from the supranational level before being adapted in a local 
version and then leading back to international action. The potential 
for synergism between the creation of national and international law 
is clear. 
B. Human Rights Law in New York City: An Enforcement-based 
Model 
Just as civil society in San Francisco sought to adopt a localized 
version of CEDAW, so did a coalition of PINGOs in New York City 
(NYC), but with much less success so far. Although a CEDAW-based 
ordinance has not yet been adopted, New York City still employs a 
strong human rights regime that is undergoing its own development, 
albeit not based on clear international inspiration. This regime 
highlights the possible pitfalls of relying on traditional law-
enforcement within human rights.  Collaborative methods may prove 
more fruitful. 
The New York City Human Rights Initiative (NYCHRI) is very 
active in promoting the adoption of a CEDAW-inspired law in New 
York. This group is “a citywide coalition of community-based 
organizations, service providers, advocacy groups, policy makers, 
labor unions and human rights activists and educators working to 
strengthen human rights standards in . . . New York City.”242 The 
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NYCHRI has proposed legislation that draws from a broad set of 
human rights principles of non-discrimination, participation, 
accountability, and transparency, including CEDAW.243 The proposed 
ordinance would expand on the current New York City Human Rights 
Law and was introduced to the New York City Council in 2010.244 
The proposal is, at the time of this writing, still before the Committee 
on Civil Rights.245 It has once before suffered political defeat,246 
perhaps because a participatory problem-solving approach such as 
that of the proposed ordinance may not be palatable in NYC in 
general and may also be incompatible with the NYC Commission on 
Human Rights’ more traditional rule-enforcement methodology,247 
which will be examined further below. 
Human rights are currently enforced in NYC by the New York City 
Commission on Human Rights (CCHR) and the City Law 
Department.248 The legal foundation is Title 8 of the Administrative 
Code of the City of New York, also known as the New York City 
Human Rights Law (the Human Rights Law, or the Law).249 In 2001, 
the Committee on Civil Rights of the Association of the Bar of the 
City of New York issued a report detailing the prevalence of 
discrimination in the City, the “crippled state of the CCHR, and the 
need for major reform.”250 Suggestions for improving the human 
rights regime included a more vigorous enforcement of the Human 
Rights Law, more publicity about the law as well as about the role of 
the CCHR.251 The report “emphatically supported reframing 
discrimination as a law enforcement issue,” rather than a participatory 
law creation issue, arguing that the threat of sanction is necessary to 
improve deterrence.252 In response, Mayor Bloomberg committed to 
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traditional enforcement approach rather than mediation or 
community-involved relations.253 The importance of law enforcement 
has also been emphasized by City Council members asserting that 
“legislation without adequate enforcement lacks impact.”254 
Accordingly, an experienced prosecutor was appointed to chair the 
CCHR, which currently consists of nine Commissioners with, for the 
most part, non-legal backgrounds.255 
The New York City Human Rights Law is one of the most 
comprehensive civil rights laws in the nation,256 even more so than 
federal law.257 The Law prohibits discrimination in employment, 
housing, and public accommodations.258 In addition, the Law affords 
protection against discrimination in employment based on arrest or 
conviction record and status as a victim of domestic violence, 
stalking, and sex offenses.259 Finally, the Law prohibits retaliation and 
bias-related harassment, including cyber-bullying.260 The Human 
Rights Law does not feature public participation provisions nearly as 
strong as those of other legal instruments analyzed in this Article, and 
will thus not be addressed further. 
It is important to consider the traditional enforcement aspect of the 
Human Rights Law as it stands in relatively stark contrast to the more 
cooperative solutions described in this Article. The CCHR may on its 
own initiative investigate suspected violations of the law.261 Affected 
victims may also file a complaint with the Law Enforcement Bureau 
of the CCHR.262 If a complaint is filed and the required mediation 
fails, the Commission makes either a “probable cause” or a “no 
probable cause” determination.263 If probable cause is found, the case 
is referred to the Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings, where 
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an administrative law judge issues a Report and Recommendation.264 
On this basis, the Commission issues its Final Decision and Order.265 
The Commission’s broad remedial powers include requiring 
respondents to take appropriate employment action such as hiring, 
reinstating, or promoting complainants; to provide reasonable 
accommodation; and/or compensating complainants for lost wages 
and emotional distress.266 In addition, the Commission has the power 
to order respondents to implement various anti-discrimination 
policies.267 Importantly, the Commission may impose a civil penalty 
of up to $250,000 if the Commission finds that the discrimination was 
the result of a willful or malicious act.268 
To those preferring more traditional, adversarial-style law 
enforcement, it is fair to say that New York follows just such a “take-
no-hostages” approach, as both the Mayor and several City Council 
members promised to do. This, however, conflicts with modern 
theories holding that cooperative law enforcement is often equally, if 
not more, substantively effective. Further, adversarial problem 
solving may not lead to the fruitful exchange of information that 
could otherwise take place before problems escalated to become 
actual “conflicts.” In other words, it may lead to perverse incentives 
for withholding information: 
[The] conception as [being] primarily a law enforcement agency is 
inconsistent with the logic of participatory problem solving. The 
participatory problem-solving approach of the San Francisco 
CEDAW ordinance depends on the willingness of agencies to 
identify their problems and to involve a facilitating body in the 
development of action plans to remedy these problems. Agencies 
are unlikely to provide this information to a body empowered to use 
it against them in the context of a lawsuit. The enforcement model 
thus creates perverse incentives in information sharing.269 
Is the New York scheme nonetheless successful? Procedurally, the 
Commission’s new two-pronged approach—an intensive initial 
interview of the complainant followed by an immediate investigation 
of the facts alleged—provides investigators with a greater-than-before 
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ability to gather evidence and build strong cases.270 This approach is 
considered the cause of a significant increase in probable cause 
determinations and resulting settlements and is thus deemed by the 
City to be a success.271 As noted with the San Francisco experiment 
above, it is substantively impossible to verify whether or not the new 
approach to alleged human rights violations has been the cause of any 
improvement. For example, fewer cases regarding citizenship status, 
disability, sexual orientation, and arrest records were filed in 2011 
compared to 2009, but more cases were filed in relation to age, 
retaliation, national origin, race, and gender issues.272 The number of 
inquiries followed the same pattern.273 
C. Climate Change in New York City: Modeling Local Authority on 
International Initiatives 
In addition to attempting to alleviate discrimination and other types 
of human rights violations, New York City is also taking decisive 
action in the climate change arena. The annual GHG emissions of 
New York City account for one-sixth of one percent of global 
emissions; the same amount as the emissions of Switzerland.274 The 
City has thus decided to take relatively aggressive action against 
climate change, and in 2007 released PlaNYC (PlaNYC or the 
Plan).275 The overall aim of the Plan is to help the City prepare for 
climate change, prepare for one million more future residents, and to 
strengthen the City economy.276 
The climate change goal of PlaNYC is threefold: First, to reduce 
city wide GHG emissions by more than 30% below 2005 levels by 
2030;277 second, to obtain an 80% emissions reduction by 2050;278 
and third, to increase the resilience of the City communities, natural 
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systems, and infrastructure to climate risks.279 To reach the overall 
goals, the Plan lists thirteen initiatives such as updating Building 
Code regulations, improving compliance with the City’s Energy 
Code, revising City codes and regulations to reduce construction and 
demolition waste, and partnering with the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) to update flood insurance rate maps.280 
Importantly, the Plan also sets specific benchmarks that a wide range 
of government departments must meet by 2013 in order to show what 
progress is made towards the 2030 goal.281 
Hailed as an “unprecedented effort,” PlaNYC was initiated by 
Mayor Bloomberg and has so far brought together more than twenty-
five City agencies to work toward the vision of a greener and better 
New York.282 The City recognizes that implementing the Plan 
“requires the collective action and resources of city government, the 
City Council, the State Legislature, state agencies, public authorities, 
the private and non-profit sectors, and individual New Yorkers.”283 
No less than seventy public and private parties are listed in 
connection with the implementation stages of the Plan.284 These 
include community-based organizations, various NGOs, the New 
York City Law Department, the New York Police Department, the 
New York Power Authority, and local development corporations, as 
well as many branches of the city, state and federal governments.285 
In developing its climate change plan, New York City took 
supranational inspiration in two ways. First, the City applies the goal 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) to 
reduce GHG emissions by 60-80% below 1990 levels by 2050.286 
Second, the City directly modeled its New York City Panel on 
Climate Change (NPCC) on the IPCC.287 NPCC consists of leading 
climate and impact scientists, academics, economists, and risk 
management, insurance, and legal experts.288 NPCC developed the 
first official climate change projections for New York City as well as 
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recommendations on how to foster an effective, ongoing, and iterative 
climate resilience program.289 NPCC is to become fully 
institutionalized290 to curtail the risk of discontinuation by future city 
leadership. 
The New York City climate change initiative demonstrates two 
important lessons: Local authorities often discuss working across 
sectors and with civil society in achieving legally binding goals and 
other important benchmarks. New York City is currently actively 
doing so. It is thus possible for local actors to not only “talk the talk,” 
but also to be able to “walk the walk” given the requisite initial 
government willingness at the decision-making level. Further, 
whereas many other actors may at least officially shy away from 
associating with United Nations bodies, however loosely, New York 
City has demonstrated that international efforts including those of the 
UN can and do lead to locally similar authority and on-the-ground 
action. 
D. Denver: Practical Lessons in Public Participation 
Denver’s experiences so far with climate change action are 
illustrative, although not so much so because of the City’s actual 
substantive provisions or possible emissions reduction results at this 
stage. Rather, Denver’s climate change agreement calls for a 
significant amount of public participation, including contributions by 
private experts. Although this would normally be a boon to the local 
community, the Denver experiment also demonstrates a pitfall in the 
use of public participation from which other implementers of public 
participation can learn. 
In 2005, the City of Denver conducted a footprint assessment and 
found that carbon emissions were increasing in direct proportion to 
the population growth.291 That same year, Mayor Hickenlooper was 
one of the first forty-nine mayors to sign the United States Mayors’ 
Climate Protection Agreement (MCPA).292 The Mayor also created 
“Greenprint Denver,” Denver’s general action plan for sustainability, 
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leaders to form the Denver Greenprint Advisory Council (Advisory 
Council).293 The Advisory Council works with scientists and 
policymakers to gain an understanding of the issues and opportunities 
faced by the City and to study best climate change practices from 
around the nation.294 The Advisory Council prepared the City of 
Denver Climate Action Plan (Action Plan), which the mayor signed in 
2007.295 
At that time, Denver’s climate change reduction goal was to reach 
10% per capita GHG reductions by 2012.296 Since the adoption of the 
Action Plan, a 2008 study showed that the American West is warming 
70% faster than the planet as a whole, and that the most significant 
temperature increase within the West is in the Colorado River 
Basin.297 As a long-term goal, the Advisory Council has thus since 
recommended that the City adopt an absolute reduction target of 25% 
by 2020 to bring the entire Denver community below 1990 levels.298 
Further, the Advisory Council has recommended that “sufficient 
time” be allowed for actions such as green market development, 
building upgrades, and retrofitting, and that future plans should look 
twenty-plus years ahead of their development.299 
The ten primary strategies that Denver plans to undertake to reach 
these goals are as follows: to develop major business and residential 
outreach campaigns; incentivize energy conservation; to create a 
voluntary travel offset program; for the City to lead by example when 
it comes to energy use at the City airport, in the City buildings, and by 
the City fleet; to enhance recycling; to create mandatory energy 
efficiency standards for new and remodeled buildings; to create 
incentives for increasing energy efficiency in existing homes; to 
create a community-wide high-performing “Green Concrete Policy” 
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which would require the use of “green concrete” (i.e., with fly ash) in 
all private and public construction projects; to establish a compact 
growth boundary with incentives for density in urban areas; and to 
render City support for alternative transportation strategies.300 Of 
these, only the energy efficiency standards for new and remodeled 
buildings, the Green Concrete Policy, and the compact growth 
boundary appear to be mandatory. In other words, only three out of 
ten steps are legally binding. For those wishing to see new climate 
change law with significant “teeth,” Denver may thus not be the best 
example. However, mandatory provisions are not the only—or even 
the best—solution to climate change issues. “Soft” incentives and 
plans may in certain contexts and locales prove to be just as or more 
efficient. 
Substantively, neither the City of Denver nor the website of the 
U.S. Conference of Mayors Climate Change Agreement indicate that 
the city was able to reach the modest goal of reducing emissions by 
10% by the end of 2012.301 Had the cities and regions been able to 
create substantively significant results, these would undoubtedly have 
been widely publicized. This is disappointing given the initially 
indicated interest in climate mitigation at this scale. Hopefully, city 
and regional efforts to reach the necessary substantive climate change 
goals will be stepped up to match the initially indicated interest levels. 
One may suspect that some of the initial promises were of a more 
promotional than sincere nature. 
As regards procedural results, at least one scholar argues that the 
only way of truly measuring “success” in the climate change area is to 
analyze whether or not the measures taken to reduce GHGs included 
public participation provisions; in other words, to examine only the 
procedural, but not the substantive aspects of the various measures.302 
Under this theory, the legal, technical, and scientific complexities of 
climate change make it impossible to trace any positive or negative 
effects to any particular substantive measure taken.303 Accordingly, 
any substantively positive result could just as well have been caused 
by one measure as the other. This Article and the author’s parallel 
project examining the possible effects of select sub-national climate 
change experiments take a differing view. While it is, of course, true 
that climate change is a highly complex problem, many other severe 
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societal problems have been as well. This has not been and should not 
be grounds for researchers and policymakers to give up attempts to 
verify any possible substantive effects of the mechanisms we study. 
Such an attitude would not only be defeatist, but also serve little 
practical purpose. In order to proceed with possible solutions to 
pressing societal problems, we will have to at least attempt to trace 
positive substantive results to their possible root causes for 
reinforcement and future replication. Refraining from verifying any 
possible substantive effects of various measures serves little 
theoretical or practical purpose. For example, if patterns appear across 
a range of climate change reduction experiments that eventually lead 
to, for example, actual GHG reductions, this would give us good 
cause to further consider whether the substantively common 
provisions of such experiments might be more effective than others. 
Granted, this is neither easy work nor work that leaves all questions 
related to causes and effects unanswered, but must be attempted 
nonetheless. 
To be sure, the procedural aspect of the Denver experience 
illustrates how public participation can be used in fruitful ways, but 
how it can also, without sufficient cautionary steps being taken, lead 
to unfortunate results. Positively, the development of the Denver 
Climate Action Plan included a wide range of civil society 
participants. Before making any final recommendations, the Advisory 
Council hosted several public forums and participated in events with 
more than 300 people present.304 Comments on the proposed Plan 
were solicited via a weblog, as well as through email and other 
writings.305 The Council itself consists of three dozen business, civic, 
and community leaders joined by managers of several City 
departments as well as experts from the University of Colorado at 
Denver.306 
The Climate Action Plan (Plan) also comprises several aspects of 
public participation. One of the Plan’s guiding principles is to 
 
304 Letter from Greenpoint Denver Advisory Council to Mayor Hickenlooper (Oct. 
2007), in DENVER CLIMATE ACTION PLAN, supra note 294. 
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“partner with community organizations, cultural institutions and 
businesses to achieve broad impact.”307 Among the first listed 
recommendations for implementation of the Plan is to “[d]evelop 
major business and residential outreach campaigns.”308 The nonprofit 
members of the Council are responsible for reaching out to Denver’s 
residents in an attempt to “nudge” them to live more sustainably.309 
For example, the “Take 5 Pledge” helps residents reduce their 
community’s energy use, water use, waste, air pollution, and improve 
Denver’s land.310 
Recognizing the importance of communications and of imparting a 
favorable opinion about the Denver climate change efforts to the 
general public and its involvement in the climate change process, 
Denver has officially adopted “social marketing” as its public 
engagement strategy: “Social marketing is a term used to describe 
non-traditional strategies that focus on changing behaviors. 
Widespread research confirms the effectiveness of social marketing 
tools to engage individuals and groups in improving their own lives 
and their communities.”311 The target audiences of this “marketing” 
campaign are businesses, neighborhoods, and youth, including several 
subgroups under each category, such as cabdrivers under the business 
category.312 Parties promoting climate change action would be well 
advised to take note of the importance of correct communication. For 
example, it may not be wise to continue the “Sky is Falling” rhetoric 
so often used in initial climate change discourse. It may be wiser to 
adopt a more practical and less fatalistic communication strategy that 
can once again engage the general citizenry and thus law and policy 
makers in true progress. 
Denver’s steps to incorporate public participation in its governance 
models are positive, just as its modern communication strategy sets an 
important example for other authorities to consider. Unfortunately, 
the Denver experiment also shows how taking the opinions of a too 
narrow range of community members into account may lead to 
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socially inopportune and skewed results. The input process needs to 
be balanced to lead to socially fair results. In the “Five Points” area of 
Denver, luxury lofts and new housing developments were built taking 
both the environment and public opinion into account.313 However, 
the area had been one of few predominantly African American-owned 
commercial strips in the country, and that segment of the community 
was virtually left out of the policymaking process.314 The 
development model followed by the “Five Points” initiative removed 
older buildings in economically struggling neighborhoods to make 
way for newer, more “attractive”—but also often more expensive—
developments.315 Some of the buildings removed presented the mere 
risk of lowering the property values of the newer developments, but 
formed part of old established and traditionally African American 
communities.316 After this gentrification process, the Five Points 
community is now much less African American and much more white 
and Hispanic than before.317 This result is somewhat surprising given 
Executive Order # 123, which calls for City officials to “[e]nsure that 
all City and program decisions incorporate [a] ‘triple bottom line’ 
analysis, balancing . . . social[] and environmental considerations.”318 
The Five Point project has thus raised environmental and social 
justice concerns that could have been better addressed by ensuring 
that the voice of the local community members was heard and duly 
taken into account before the development was completed. In other 
words, the project failed both procedurally and substantively seen 
from the African American community’s point of view. The Five 
Point experience could even be said to present human rights 
implications. This is so because modernly, human rights—in addition 
to environmental concerns—cover the freedom from arbitrary 
interference in privacy or family life as well as the right to property. 
Both rights were arguably violated in Denver. Other cities and regions 
should remember to apply public participation provisions in their 
decision-making processes in more socially balanced ways. 
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E. Santa Fe: Interweaving Sustainability with Principles of 
Economic Health and Social Justice 
Santa Fe, New Mexico undertook to reduce its GHG emissions by 
7% by 2012 in 2008.319 Subsequently, Santa Fe adopted the Mayor’s 
Climate Protection Agreement “2030 Challenge” under which the city 
seeks to reduce its fossil fuel energy consumption by 70% by 2015 
and to become carbon neutral by 2030.320 Although the latter is 
substantively impressive, what makes the Santa Fe plan interesting for 
purposes of this Article is how the city has broadened its view of the 
sustainability challenges to be solved in the near and far future. The 
“Sustainable Santa Fe Plan” does not approach the issues to be solved 
separately via a veritable “to do list” as many other cities do. Rather, 
the city recognizes that sustainability “also can be defined as the 
intersection between three principals [sic]; environmental 
stewardship, economic health; and social justice.”321 
This plan addresses more than just greenhouse gas emissions. It 
looks to the history and culture of Santa Fe and incorporates other 
values of this community. By doing this, it takes a plan that would 
normally have a single focus and uses it as a catalyst to promote 
“community sustainability” by also considering other social and 
economic goals. It attempts to distribute the benefits and costs of 
moving towards sustainability in an equitable way.322 
Exactly how does Santa Fe plan to implement this more equitable 
approach? A city official explains that the three areas are meant to 
pose guidelines for the City to follow, and gives as examples of 
actually implemented action the following:323 the City and County 
Food Policy Advisory Council includes directors of several food 
providers for food-insecure residents. The Council is developing 
policies and partnerships to reduce risks of food insecurity resulting 
from climate change and peak oil prices. The City has undertaken an 
extensive bilingual community outreach process for input on how to 
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use land use regulations and public investments to improve the health 
outcomes of the poorest areas of the community. In cooperation with 
a local non-profit organization, the City has also funded a low-interest 
loan program for energy efficiency and solar energy improvements 
for income-qualified homeowners. Further, the City makes use of an 
aggressive building code for residences. In developing this, the City 
worked with the non-profit organizations Homewise and Habitat for 
Humanity to ensure that the code would not result in a net increase of 
home prices. This has been accomplished because, among other 
things, investment costs are offset by energy savings. In fact, the code 
has facilitated lower out-of-pocket expenses for homes smaller than 
3,000 square feet (typically, low-income persons do not live in homes 
larger than that). Homes larger than 3,000 square feet have to comply 
with more strict energy efficiency requirements. The City official 
notes that these steps have been universally accepted by civil society 
in Santa Fe, which prides itself on being a socially progressive city in 
general.324 Finally, fiscal impact reports must be prepared in relation 
to any measures taken by the City. Accordingly, the Santa Fe 
Building Code was developed with the active assistance of a range of 
parties such as a homebuilders association, realtors, suppliers, Habitat 
for Humanity, and Homewise. These market actors and specialists in 
each their own area responded to the City’s need to find out what 
made the most economic sense, but also what steps would embrace 
the three sustainability issues before the Code was developed. 
The Santa Fe example demonstrates the level of cooperation that 
can, with appropriate planning and government mandates, be 
established among private and public actors. Perhaps more 
importantly, the example shows how modern governance models can 
actively promote synergism between environmental, social, and 
economic issues. It also shows how cities can produce more long-
term viable results for a wider segment of society by taking a step 
back from yesterday’s more narrow focus on one-track solutions. A 
broader view of development and sustainability presents greater 
 
324 Id. In many areas of the nation, homes larger than 3000 square feet would be 
considered very large and thus probably more likely to be purchased by well-to-do 
individuals whereas poorer individuals may not be able to afford homes of that much 
square footage. To the extent that most residents of Santa Fe consider it fair that people 
who are more financially secure than others face stricter and perhaps more expensive 
environmental regulations, this could explain the fact that this particular requirement is 
“universally accepted” in Santa Fe. The author’s phone interview with Ms. Mortimer did 
not go into detail with this. 
120 OREGON REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 15, 63 
potential for equitable approaches. In short, the Santa Fe example 
possesses interesting potential that should be followed in future 
scholarship. 
F. London: New Frameworks for Climate Change and Public 
Participation 
In contrast to cities in the United States, London operates under a 
triple set of rules governing climate change: city, national, and EU 
law. To better understand the city rules and general attitude towards 
climate change mandates in London, a brief introduction to the 
overarching EU and national rules is helpful before proceeding with 
the London example in particular. 
Whereas federal climate change is more marked by inaction than 
action in the United States, the situation in the United Kingdom (and 
thus London) is more promising. First, the United Kingdom Climate 
Change Act of 2008 set the statutory target of CO2 emissions 
reductions to at least 80% below 1990 levels by 2050 with an interim 
target of 34% by 2020.325 The latter goes even further than the EU’s 
“20 by 20” goal whereby the EU has committed to reduce regional 
GHG emissions by 20% over 1990 levels by 2020.326 Additionally, 
the Renewable Energy Directive of 2009 calls for the United 
Kingdom to source 15% of its energy from renewable sources by 
2020, almost a seven-fold increase from 2008 in little more than a 
decade.327 
Second, the United Kingdom has adopted several Acts, the goal of 
which are to empower local governments to reach climate change and 
general sustainability goals while taking the triad of bottom-up law 
development, public participation, and overall social “well-being” 
into account. For example, the Localism Act of 2011 imposes a 
specific “duty to cooperate” on the mayor of London, the relatively 
new Greater London Authority (GLA), and the thirty-three London 
boroughs.328 The Localism Act signals a major shift of responsibilities 
 
325 PLANNING & CLIMATE CHANGE COALITION, PLANNING FOR CLIMATE CHANGE—
GUIDANCE FOR LOCAL AUTHORITIES 5 (Apr. 2012), available at http://www.tcpa.org.uk 
/data/files/PCC_Guide_April_2012.pdf. 
326 What is the EU Doing About Climate Change?, EUROPEAN COMMISSION: CLIMATE 
ACTION, http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm (last updated Jan. 7, 
2013). The EU has further committed to reducing its GHG emissions by 80-95% 
compared to 1990 levels by 2050. Id. 
327 PLANNING & CLIMATE CHANGE COALITION, supra note 325, at 5. 
328 London and the Localism Act, FUTURE OF LONDON (Dec. 13, 2011), 
http://www.futureoflondon.org.uk/2011/12/13/london-and-the-localism-act/. 
2013] An Unstoppable Tide: Creating Environmental 121 
and Human Rights Law from the Bottom Up 
to local authority and community levels in England.329 It also creates a 
platform for traditional local authorities, other public bodies, Local 
Enterprise Partnerships (officially recognized partnerships between 
local authorities and businesses), and Local Nature Partnerships 
(government partnerships with environmental organizations) to work 
together locally on the sustainable development of land.330 Individual 
think tanks such as the Planning and Climate Change Coalition 
support government planning efforts under the Localism Act in an 
attempt to ensure that the planning system responds effectively to the 
climate challenge.331 
Another innovative step that seeks to take multi-level governance 
in the U.K. in a new direction is the Local Government Act of 2000, 
which introduces a specific “duty of well-being.” In pertinent part, the 
Act empowers local authorities as follows: 
Every local authority are to have power to do anything which they 
consider is likely to achieve any one or more of the following 
objects— 
(a) the promotion or improvement of the economic well-being of 
their area, 
(b) the promotion or improvement of the social well-being of their 
area, and 
(c) the promotion or improvement of the environmental well-being 
of their area.332 
This broad power enables eligible government bodies to do 
anything which they consider is likely to achieve the promotion or 
improvement of the economic, social or environmental well-being 
of their area. The [national] Government’s purpose in extending the 
well-being power to eligible councils is to give communities greater 
flexibility to act on their priorities and to facilitate joint working 
between local councils and their partners in the private and public 
sector.333 
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The breadth of the power removes the need for local councils to 
rely on other legislation in order to take particular action. Instead, 
local councils can look to the well-being power in the first instance. 
In other words, they can regard it as a “power of first resort,” albeit 
still one featuring various built-in safeguards.334 
Some government bodies have employed this authority to address 
climate change.335 Although local authorities receive both guidance 
and national performance indicators from the national government, 
there is no statutory responsibility to follow such guidance.336 This 
has broadened the scope for local governments to act on climate 
change through individually preferable means and led to a greater 
level of involvement by local authorities than was the case in the late 
1990s.337 The new power has thus enabled local authorities “to move 
away from their necessarily cautious approach to innovation and joint 
action which had previously limited their contribution to the 
improvement of the quality of life of their communities.”338 Finally, 
the national government has adopted affirmative steps to remove 
legislative barriers that stand in the way of government efficiency.339 
In London proper, several new local governance developments also 
stand out in relation to climate change. In 2004, the impetus for local 
climate change action in London came directly from the Mayor who, 
without having any direct statutory authority to do so, developed an 
energy strategy for London that placed climate center stage.340 In 
addition to its substantive goals, a focal point of this strategy was to 
emphasize voluntary action through a partnership approach by 
forming the London Energy Partnership (made up of a consortium of 
businesses, government and public bodies)341 and cooperating with 
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two other partnerships.342 In 2005, the London Climate Change 
Agency was established as a municipal company wholly owned and 
controlled by the London Development Agency, but with significant 
private and civil sector support from, among other actors, BP, KPMG, 
the City of London Corporation, Greenpeace, and the Rockefeller 
Brothers’ Trust.343 Additionally, the London Climate Change 
Partnership (LCCP) is an independent group of more than thirty 
organizations who have an important role to play in trying to do what 
is locally possible to mitigate climate change, but ultimately also in 
preparing London for the impacts of climate change.344 Among the 
objectives of the LCCP is to gather and disseminate high quality 
information to assist in further developments of the London Plan, as 
well as other strategies and policies that affect London, including by 
providing key consulting and communication assistance.345 General 
and steering group members include participants from government 
agencies, private business NGOs, accounting, energy, and 
development companies as well as climate scientists and 
communication specialists.346 
In 2007, the Greater London Authority Act of 2007 (GLA Act) 
charged the Mayor with the new specific duty of “tak[ing] action with 
a view to mitigation of, or adaptation to, climate change.”347 The 
Mayor is now required to produce local statutory strategies for 
climate change mitigation and adaptation as well as new energy 
strategies.348 Although the London mayor’s direct powers are limited 
compared to similar offices in other world cities,349 each individual 
mayor still has relatively strong powers.350 Thus, the GLA Act creates 
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an important legal platform that remains as mayors and their political 
platforms change. 
Via the above and other measures, the City addresses sustainability 
through an updated version of what is known as the “London Plan.”351 
This is the “overall strategic plan for London . . . set[ting] out a fully 
integrated economic, environmental, transport and social framework 
for the development of the capital to 2031.”352 The climate change 
target is to reduce London’s CO2 emissions by 60% of 1990 levels by 
2025 and at least 80% by 2050.353 Sections 5.2, 5.5, and 5.7 are 
considered particularly important in reaching this goal. Section 5.2 
sets forth an energy hierarchy that requires the City to “1) [b]e lean: 
use less energy; 2) [b]e clean: supply energy efficiently; [and] 3) [b]e 
green: use renewable energy.”354 (“Lean, clean, green”). Section 5.5 
requires 25% of the heat and power used in London to be generated 
through use of localized decentralized heating systems by 2025. 
Section 5.7 increases the proportion of energy generated from 
renewable sources. 
The renewed London Plan is noteworthy because of the extent to 
which public participation informed the development of the climate 
change policies. A Senior Strategic Planner from the GLA explains: 
Shortly after his election, the current Mayor consulted on his 
‘Planning for a better London’ in July 2008. This led to a full 
review of the London Plan. Initial proposals were published in his 
document ‘A new Plan for London’ in April 2009—formally for 
consultation with the London Assembly and the GLA functional 
bodies although comments were invited from anyone wished to give 
them. Both these documents included sustainability and climate 
change elements relating to development. The draft climate change 
policies were initially developed with the help of colleagues in the 
Greater London Authority and other organisations that we work 
with such as the LUCID programme (The Development of Local 
Urban Climatic Model and its application to Intelligent Design of 
Cities). The draft replacement London Plan was [subsequently] 
published for full public consultation . . . The development of the 
London Plan is informed by an Integrated Impact Assessment (IIA) 
as required by national and European legislation. The IIA aims to 
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assess the potential social (including health and crime), economic 
and environmental impacts of the proposed plan. To inform the IIA, 
meetings and workshops were held with internal and external 
stakeholders, including with those with expert knowledge on 
sustainability and climate change. Relevant comments from the 
public consultation and the IIA process were reflected in the version 
of the draft replacement Plan that was submitted to the Planning 
Inspectorate for the Examination in Public. During the EiP selected 
stakeholders were invited to discuss and provide evidence on the 
proposed policies. The climate change policies were covered by this 
process. Therefore, there have been numerous opportunities for 
public input into the development of the climate change policies in 
the [updated] London Plan.355 
The London Plan is also noteworthy because it is legally binding. 
The Mayor must work with boroughs and developers to ensure that 
all City developments meet the targets set forth in the Plan.356 This is 
implemented as follows:357 all developments referred to the Mayor for 
his approval are to be accompanied by an Energy Assessment 
demonstrating how the energy hierarchy and targets set out in London 
Plan policy 5.2 have been addressed and met. Experts then review the 
Assessment to ensure that the methodology is appropriate. If the 
targets are not met, negotiations will be undertaken in an attempt to 
make sure that they are. In complex situations, section 5.2 compliance 
will be assessed along with other policy objectives. Where a solution 
cannot be met, a contribution towards offsetting carbon emissions 
elsewhere in the local area is sought. The proposals set out in the 
Energy Assessment can also be secured by way of a condition on the 
planning approval or through a “s106 planning obligation,” which is a 
legal agreement entered into by the developer. Financial contributions 
can be secured through s106 obligations. Compliance and 
enforcement issues are dealt with by the local planning authorities, 
who are responsible for implementing the Plan at local level. Finally, 
some boroughs seek annual energy statements from developments to 
ensure compliance. 
Identifying the exact original drivers of climate change action in 
London is complex, but can in large part be traced back to the strong 
original interest level of a keenly interested mayor, added to over time 
by support from the local and national governments. The current 
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impetus consists of the commitments of not only the Mayor, but also 
key individuals and interest groups, a generally positive climate of 
public opinion towards climate change alleviation, a lack of overt 
opposition from key interest groups and the emergence of new market 
opportunities.358 
Pinpointing the authorities overseeing climate change action is 
equally complex. On the one hand, the central government directs the 
local government via, for example, performance indicators; but on the 
other hand, considerable scope for local government to act through 
individually chosen means still exists, as shown above.359 This 
situation is somewhat different from that of U.S. cities which, because 
they enjoy no direct recognition in the Constitution, are mere 
conveniences of each state and thus have more limited original 
powers. 
In addition to ensuring the procedurally sound method of public 
participation in both information-gathering and policy-making, what 
are some possible substantive results achieved in London? Substantial 
CO2 savings were secured through implementation of the London 
Plan in 2010, at least in the building sector.360 For example, London 
achieved an average CO2 savings of 33% per building development 
over and above a 2006 baseline development including unregulated 
energy.361 London also saw a reduction of approximately 50% in 
regulated CO2 emissions beyond the minimum requirements 
contained in the 2006 building regulations.362 Overall, in 2010, 
projected annual CO2 savings of almost 72,000 tonnes of CO2 were 
secured, which is the same as retrofitting cavity wall insulation in 
approximately 111,000 existing homes.363 However, the largest CO2 
reductions were due to energy efficiency and combined heat and 
power developments with only a smaller amount of energy saving—
3%—due to renewable energy.364 
So far, the London experiment is thus arguably both procedurally 
and substantively more successful than comparable U.S. solutions. 
Public participation and cross-competence governance is as important 
in London as ever. Sustainability remains key. Of course, this may in 
 
358 Schroeder & Bulkeley, supra note 340, at 338. 
359 Id. at 334. 
360 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 353, at 4. 
361 Id. 
362 Id. 
363 Id. at 5. 
364 Id. 
2013] An Unstoppable Tide: Creating Environmental 127 
and Human Rights Law from the Bottom Up 
large part be due to a national legislative climate that is more 
conducive to sustainability issues per se, but which also focuses a 
great deal more on localism and enforced cooperative public-private 
governance than is the case in the United States. The mandate for 
local authorities to ensure economic, social, and environmental well-
being is, to be sure, progressive governance. So is the government’s 
willingness to take active steps to remove legislative barriers that may 
stand in the way of environmentally and socially sound developments. 
Similarly, the new duty placed upon the City of London to take 
affirmative action against climate change, in combination with the 
City’s own interest in doing so, are different from what often seems to 
be mere indications of hope for long-term change or mere empty 
rhetoric in the United States. In other words, the official government 
stance towards climate change in London and the United Kingdom at 
large is more favorable towards taking broad and deep action at 
several levels. This may, of course, stem not so much from intrinsic 
government motivation, but rather from the public opinion towards 
climate change in the United Kingdom having evolved more than is 
yet to be seen in the United States. Further, the rhetorical and 
practical environment in the United Kingdom has not been one in 
which strong interest groups have demonstrated marked opposition 
towards climate change, as has been the case in the United States. 
Additionally, British corporate life has demonstrated a greater interest 
in the new business opportunities presented by climate regulations, 
which is different from the situation in the United States. In spite of 
such differences, valuable lessons can be learned from the London 
experiences. These can be applied not only to environmental law as it 
intersects with human rights issues, but also to developments within 
human rights separate from environmental issues. Similarly, the legal 
community can learn much from the American developments within 




New and relatively untraditional action is needed to solve pressing 
matters within environmental and human rights in a timely manner. 
Waiting for action from the top down has proved largely unviable, 
especially in relation to urgent matters such as climate change and 
other environmental human rights. Drawing together the experiences 
from the five city experiments analyzed above, this section will 
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produce a set of guidelines for future work in this area. Much of the 
knowledge gained is also applicable to other areas of the law than just 
human rights, environmental law, or the combination thereof. The 
most important insights relate to the development of new law, the 
substance of such law, and the implementation and enforcement of 
law. This section will proceed in that order. 
A. Development of the Law 
Often, the law is framed in negative terms stating what we can, but 
more often what we cannot, do. It places limits on us, but often does 
not set forth specific goals as to what should be accomplished with 
the law in question. It helps to go beyond a negative rights framework 
by adopting a positive rights approach, which was done in San 
Francisco. In such an approach, both the rights of and aspirational 
goals for the intended segment of society are specifically described. A 
positive rights approach also places specific, affirmative obligations 
on the implementing actors.365 Adopting such a framework may 
require re-conceptualizing negative paradigms366—for example, 
“antidiscrimination”—into more positive terms and goals, such as 
those contained in human rights instruments. This was done in San 
Francisco and presents equally effective potential for other locales 
and areas of the law. The British climate change experience also 
exemplifies how modern governments can, with good results, set 
positive goals, such as creating social, economic, and environmental 
“well-being.” Although this may at first blush appear to be an 
impossibly broad mandate, the London experience shows how local 
implementing bodies can at the same time be given equally broad 
powers to do almost “anything” required to reach the substantive 
goals. In short a shift from the negative to the positive may be 
expedient. 
Second, inspiration from international instruments and action can 
inspire and inform local legal developments. Obtaining inspiration 
from international sources allows us to learn valuable lessons from an 
even wider range of experiments than just national ones and avoid the 
waste of precious time by having to reinvent the proverbial wheel. As 
many legal issues transcend national borders, this is, of course, a plus. 
But the ideal model for the development of the most effective law 
seen from a local point of view is actually a hybrid model: one that is 
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not wholly international, but also not wholly national.367 Simply put, 
hybrid models present the best of both worlds. Perhaps more 
importantly in U.S. society, they are advantageous because of the 
“foreignness” with which many Americans associate international 
law.368 Whereas it may be difficult to generate broad civil society 
acceptance of laws that may be seen as “foreign” or internationally 
sourced, it will be easier to do so if the law in question is developed to 
feature localized input as well. Localized law is, of course, also 
substantively better. Further, it may be easier to build momentum 
towards the eventual national ratification of a possible international 
instrument such as a particular treaty that inspired local action if civil 
society and our elected representatives first become acquainted with 
localized versions of such international initiatives.369 The San 
Francisco model showed a clear example of how law can be 
developed from the bottom up with clear international inspiration. 
The New York climate change model also draws on some of the best 
practices from international models. 
The New York human rights model further shows the importance 
of not merely emulating experiences gained elsewhere, but of 
localizing frameworks to match local preferences. New York places a 
much heavier emphasis on traditional law enforcement than San 
Francisco’s more cooperative human rights law enforcement 
approach. For the reasons described above, it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to identify which is the “better” of the two approaches; 
both arguably work well. Nonetheless, scholarship tends to point 
towards the collaborative approach as presenting new and very 
expedient options that may be well pursuing at local level just as this 
approach is used in many international instruments. In contrast, New 
York appears to be a city in which constituents prefer “strong” and 
more traditional action. It is important to take such local preferences 
into account when designing new legal models. 
Both the New York human rights and the London climate change 
models show the decisive action that can be taken when cities have 
mayors willing to take swift and decisive action. However, this leads 
to the related concern that mayors are, after all, just temporary actors. 
Subsequent administrations can wipe out much positive action 
initiated at the mayoral level unless this becomes institutionalized 
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when created. Thus, when potential new government agencies and 
programs are created, it is important that these are chartered and thus 
do not exist only at the pleasure of the mayor. This would ensure that 
challenges to their existence would have to be given out to 
referendum in turn making new programs more stable and less 
vulnerable to the whims of future government entities.370 
All the above experiments also showed that iterative, adjustable 
processes are important to the development of new legal models. Law 
development is not and should not be static; it should be an ongoing, 
flexible process that can accommodate new developments and 
knowledge within law, science, and other relevant bodies of 
knowledge as it appears. This is of particular importance to climate 
change, where science is evolving more rapidly than what the law has 
been able to keep up with so far. For example, the Kyoto Protocol 
initially mandated GHG emissions reductions of a mere 5%. It has 
since become clear that this goal is woefully insufficient. Of course, 
this should be seen in the context of the difficulty of getting a large 
amount of nations to sign on to any legally binding agreement 
regarding what was then a problem of relatively newly discovered 
significance. To be sure, “baby steps” are important to the 
development of both national and international law, but so is the 
ability to adjust legal requirements as scientific and other knowledge 
evolves. Authorities still have much to learn in this respect: only 70% 
of the sustainability plans examined in one body of scholarship placed 
emphasis on the continuous monitoring, evaluation, and updating of 
the plans.371 This percentage should be increased. 
Although none of the experiments analyzed above clearly reference 
non-Western normative ideals, or perhaps exactly because of this, it is 
relevant to remember the importance of avoiding an exclusive 
emphasis on “narcissist law,” i.e., law that leans more or less 
exclusively on Western ideals. Non-Western ideals of how law and 
society should develop may, of course, be applicable and beneficial to 
Western legal systems as well. Such ideals are finally working their 
way into legal discourse, such as that produced by at least one 
prominent ICJ justice.372 Non-Western traditions and thinking are of 
obvious relevance to not only international law, but also various 
aspects of national substantive law in an increasingly international 
society. Philosophies regarding, for example, who the law seeks to 
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protect; who the law should seek to protect; why; and how, may be 
particularly relevant to the two substantive legal areas that form the 
topic for this Article. Such thinking should be considered in future 
lawmaking in these and other areas. 
Public participation at the law development stage has numerous 
recognized advantages and is implemented more and more frequently 
both in the United States and beyond. For example, the San Francisco, 
Denver, Santa Fe, London, and New York climate change 
developments all feature provisions for extensive civil society 
involvement and public/private partnerships. Some of the cities 
analyzed also require broader cross-sector government engagement 
and, as shown in London, even a specific duty to cooperate across 
sectors. Such expanded involvement of not only civil society, but 
better cooperation by relevant government actors is a procedurally 
sound method of law development. In contrast, the New York human 
rights model does not feature very noteworthy public participation. 
Because of this, it may be seen as less “successful,” at least from a 
procedural point of view. 
Instead of seeing legal developments from a binary “top-down” or 
“bottom-up” perspective, some scholars apply a four-faceted model. 
This is worth considering briefly as it sheds further light on the value 
of what this Article refers to as bottom-up models and the value of 
these to future governance. The four-prong model asks whether 
governance is performed under a “self-governing model,” a “control 
and compliance model,” a “provision model,” or an “enabling 
model.”373 First, the “control and compliance” model is most closely 
related to the traditional development of law. As binding mandates 
are being set from a higher authority that also verifies compliance and 
enforces observance, this model compares to a top-down solution. 
The control and compliance model is used in those aspects of the 
London sustainability framework where standards are being set by the 
central government and the EU, but where the Mayor subsequently 
creates local mandates for sustainable energy use. Perhaps because it 
is a top-down model, much of the London Plan met with significant 
challenges from the business community in London in the form of 
contestation over the rights and responsibilities of different actors.374 
Nonetheless, the model is important, as national or supranational 
impetus is still important in shaping possibilities for local action. This 
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model uses already existing legal framework and modalities. Civil 
society will thus have a great deal of familiarity with governance 
through this model, for better or worse. Importantly, it enables multi-
level governance, which is important to many aspects of the law, such 
as the development of building codes, which must often meet national 
standards but are implemented and enforced locally. 
The “self-governing” model compares to a pure bottom-up model. 
Under this, authorities take voluntary action to reach their goals 
without specific directives from above. This was the case with some 
of the London, San Francisco, Denver, and Santa Fe action, but is not 
yet the most predominant governance model on a broader scale. A 
mixture of self-governance and national impetus is more realistic at 
this point in time. 
The “provision” model is another example of a bottom-up model 
under which utility companies that have not been privatized can, more 
easily than purely profit-driven private companies, choose to provide 
society with energy and related solutions that are more sustainable 
than others—for example, selling a larger-than-before share of 
renewable energy, providing other energy “services” (e.g., “concierge 
services”375), improving water management, etcetera. However, this 
model is waning because of the large extent to which privatization has 
already taken place and is still taking place. Nonetheless, where 
possible, this model is still considered key to environmental law 
because it enables on-the-ground, swift development of sustainable 
energy and sets important examples for other utilities to follow. 
The “enabling” model is a bottom-up solution with some top-down 
characteristics.  It is considered important to sustainability efforts. 
Under this, governments “steer” other actors, including those in the 
voluntary and private sectors and at the community level, to act for 
the public good. This model includes a large amount of public-private 
partnerships as well as subsidies and other “soft” incentives for non-
governmental actors to reach particular policy ends. It is a response to 
“declining formal powers and competencies, a means of getting things 
done when other channels are blocked.”376 The enabling model is 
increasingly mandated by central governments and thus shares 
commonalities with top-down solutions. It is, for example, used in 
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London where governments are now expected to work closely with 
non-government partners representing both business and purely 
private interests. In the United States, the closest version of what may 
be seen as an enabling model is still federal “grant-in-aid” schemes to 
local governments to enable the implementation of national goals at 
the local level. Many positive lessons can be learned in the United 
States and around the world from the London experience about 
enabling local government to establish better local environments in 
closer cooperation with the ultimate civil society stakeholders. 
Bottom-up law development through enabling models presents 
significant advantages not only to environmental law, but also other 
areas of the law. 
Using the terminology just described, the “provision” and 
“enabling” models in many ways compare to what others simply call 
“bottom-up development” of the law. No matter what name is used 
for these models, they fill important gaps in relation to the role of law 
in urban environmental and human rights governance. National- and 
international-level action would still be highly advantageous to round 
out the picture of law development more homogeneously in both 
environmental and human rights law. It would also add significant 
law enforcement benefits. But until such scaled-up action is 
undertaken, local bottom-up action involving a multitude of actors 
including cities is key. 
B. Substantive Contents in Legal Developments 
The contents of the substantive provisions of new law is, of course, 
up to civil society and our lawmakers. This section will thus only 
highlight some generally applicable considerations that can be drawn 
from the above experiences. 
First, as the Denver and Santa Fe examples show, it is important to 
consider the social and environmental justice implications of new 
legal provisions. In Denver, the African American community was 
affected when a construction project should and did bring about 
certain improvements of the area in question, but failed to take into 
account that the increasing price level resulting from this 
improvement would cause a shift in the racial make-up of the area. 
Human rights scholarship is ripe with examples of how poor 
environmentally related decisions may rise to the level of human 
rights violations. None of the above examples have presented 
problems of such magnitude, not even the Denver development.  
However, it is a sound approach to consider new action to be taken 
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from a broad perspective including a broad range of social, economic, 
environmental and possible human rights consequences. Santa Fe did 
so with its focus on interweaving environmental stewardship with 
economic health and social justice. So did London by promoting 
“well-being” seen from a combined environmental, economic, and 
social point of view. 
Attempting to take broad social implications into account when 
developing the law will raise the question of what “law” is to begin 
with. Considering this will help participants in the lawmaking process 
present arguments that the law has never just been a narrow range of 
cautious statutory or judge-made principles and should not be now 
either. Modern society is ill served by attempts to frame law so 
narrowly at a point in time when we need to broaden our conceptual 
understanding of what it takes to move forward in more socially 
expedient ways than perhaps ever before. Thus, as demonstrated, it is 
beneficial to consider the notion of law to be broad enough to also 
comprise ethical norms of what is “right” and what is “wrong.” This 
will serve the environmental agenda well. The best law is that which 
features a great amount of intrinsic reasonableness and value seen 
from a broad, societal point of view. Social pressure can lead to just 
such norm-formation. Law is not merely traditional or “hard” law, but 
can—and should—contain elements of morality and general justice. 
Modernly, it is thus appropriate and expedient to consider law to 
comprise notions of “soft law” as well. This has the added advantage 
that civil society is equally or more likely to adhere to such law than 
strictly enforced, traditional-style mandates. As the discourse related 
to natural law further proves, modern legal developments should be—
and in fact often are—taken from not only an anthropological point in 
view, but also from an ecocentric point of view. If doing so, we take 
into account not only human beings and our needs, but also the 
inherent value we get from our non-human planetary co-inhabitants. 
For example, legal discourse relating to natural and human rights law 
already incorporates consideration of “life.” One day, this might be 
legitimately expanded to cover non-human life as well. Laws already 
exist to protect threatened and endangered species, so this might not 
be a tremendous stretch of the legal imagination, as it may first 
appear. Similarly, our anthropological interest in, for example, 
aesthetic experiences, knowledge, and a clean, healthy environment 
by definition requires taking both animals and our other natural 
surroundings into account. Creating law from a broad perspective 
that, for example, incorporates the value of the natural environment 
for its own sake because it is simply the right thing to do is a more 
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sustainable approach to legal developments than many current and 
more traditional legal approaches. 
Substantive direction was, in San Francisco, influenced by 
international human rights treaty law. In New York, a local agency 
was created based on UN developments. Can an argument be made 
that sub-national action may also be modeled on international 
customary law or general principles of international law? 
Unfortunately not—at least, not yet. To do so would require pervasive 
and consistent national-level action taken out of a sense of legal 
obligation, but that is precisely the problem: national governments are 
often not taking substantively sufficient action when it comes to either 
environmental law or human rights law. Even when they do, the 
action taken is often too sporadic and new seen from an international 
point of view to classify as either customary law or general principles 
of international law. Accordingly, to emulate action on international 
law is arguably still best done by relying on treaty law. In this 
connection, it is important to remember that the demarcation between 
what was traditionally seen as “national” and “international” law is 
blurring. In some nations and contexts, even this line-blurring itself 
may not matter much. However, in the United States, attempts to mix 
national and international law may present significant sovereignty and 
federalism issues that will need to be addressed by law-and- policy-
makers. But it is important to bear in mind that whereas taking local 
action with some potential international implications may well present 
some difficult questions to be resolved, non-action in relation to 
issues of an international nature is even more problematic. 
A note on cultural shifts and societal attitudes towards substantive 
legal provisions is in order in the context of which values different 
societies place on different norms and laws. For example, prevalent 
popular rhetoric indicates that many people tend to think that the EU 
is simply “different” when it comes to promoting both environmental 
sustainability and broad human rights issues. Thus, some may 
consider the attitude towards similar issues to be more or less 
unchangeable in the United States. But this would be a mistake, for 
although some basic values change rather slowly here, they do 
eventually do so. Consider, for example, the women’s rights 
movement. Some may argue that this has not changed sufficiently yet, 
and for good reason. But there can be no doubt that women’s rights in 
the United States have not changed dramatically for the better over a 
few decades. Similarly, a shift in the attitude towards environmental 
protection is noticeable in the United States, “even” among 
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companies and “even” towards, for example, climate change. It is 
beyond the scope of this Article to analyze what causes such shifts in 
values. It is sufficient to point out here that social values do change 
over time, and with them, relevant laws must change substantively as 
well. Where the national and supranational regime may react too 
slowly or not at all, bottom-up polycentric action becomes highly 
relevant. 
C. Implementation 
Just as law is best initially developed through flexible, iterative 
processes, so should the implementation of new law be seen as an 
ongoing and flexible process. To make this as successful as possible, 
it has proved beneficial to measure progress against numerous 
benchmarks and to make adjustments along the way as necessary. 
Still, only 55% of the sustainability plans examined in one study 
created any implementation priorities.377 Authorities should make 
better use of such priorities, benchmarks, and other tools in 
prioritizing the action to be taken. The New York climate change 
model showed an example of a model that incorporates a large 
number of very specific benchmarks for a range of different 
government bodies. This promotes accountability and creates useful 
specificity for goal achievement purposes. San Francisco showed how 
monitoring and benchmark tools, such as the Gender Analysis Tool 
and Gender Responsive Budgeting, can be used in procedurally 
successful ways locally and promoted for international use even 
where the source for these initiatives was international law to begin 
with. Thus, “law” may initially stem from international inspiration, 
become localized, and then lead back up to the supranational scale. 
Interdisciplinary and interagency approaches are called for in many 
areas of the law, but perhaps none so much so as climate change law. 
The current trend in the United States seems to be that authorities 
recognize this, but nonetheless limit such cooperation to their 
respective geographical regions. For example, Denver, Santa Fe, and 
New York City all indicate an interest in being seen as “leaders” 
within climate change and sustainability efforts (as do many other 
cities). Such competition may be seen as healthy, but research also 
shows that collaborative approaches present significant synergisms 
and economies of scale. It may prove very difficult or impossible to 
replicate these in a timely manner if most cities or regions continue to 
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attempt to produce their own unique solutions to problems. There is 
no need to reinvent the wheel. Actors are well advised to actively 
seek out and encourage greater amounts of cooperation not only 
locally, but also regionally and internationally, for better substantive 
legal goals. 
Of course, good law is all about good communication. And good 
law must, as shown, involve civil society stakeholders. How are these 
goals accomplished? Through public participation, but also through 
intelligent communication strategies. The Denver and London 
governance models exemplify today’s key awareness of the 
importance of getting the message across to civil society in effective 
ways. Denver thus deliberately uses “social marketing” in an attempt 
to nudge civil society actors—both private and corporate—to change 
their behavior in the ways necessary for the City to reach its goals. 
London obtains consulting and communication assistance in relation 
to its London Plan from specialized private actors. Other localities 
should develop similar strategies. 
D. Enforcement 
What is law without enforcement and penalties, some may ask. 
Part of the answer is that law is not necessarily only observed because 
of external threats; intrinsic motivators and cooperative approaches 
are arguably just as effective in bringing about observance. This 
Article has operated with two major approaches to law enforcement: 
the traditional adversarial method (a “stick” model) and the more 
“carrot-like” cooperative method. Under the former, authorities can 
and will impose penalties and take other punitive or quasi-punitive 
action if legal mandates are violated. This adversarial-style approach 
is taken by the human rights regime in New York City. As the name 
indicates, the cooperative method is one in which collaboration 
between the overseeing authorities and the implementing actors is 
seen as key in reaching the objectives of the law in question. San 
Francisco uses this methodology in enforcing its human rights 
principles. What is better, an adversarial approach or a collaborative 
one? This question cannot be answered in full here or arguably 
anywhere, in part because it is difficult to trace substantive successes 
to any specific legal mandates and thus also to verify if any specific 
feedback loop on substantive failures work better than others. 
Nonetheless, research for this article shows that the collaborative 
approach is at least becoming more and more prevalent both in sub-
national law as well as in supranational instruments. Of course, 
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traditional enforcement has its place in some contexts, such as in 
egregious cases of law violations and, arguably, where the law has 
deliberately been violated; but it is simply not true that for laws to be 
enforced, threats of penalties and other adversarial solutions always 
have to be applied. In several contexts, “softer” approaches such as 
assistance and cooperation has proved to be just as, if not more, 
beneficial. This is the case both in San Francisco, but also with 
international models such as those employed by the UNFCCC and the 
Aarhus Convention. Regardless of which model is used, enforcement 
functions should be located in separately dedicated bodies in order to 
avoid perverse incentives in withholding information from 
governments in order to not be penalized because of what that 
information reveals. 
The above mainly relates to government bodies, but why does civil 
society observe the law? As with authoritative bodies, individuals do 
not only observe the law because of the threat of fines or other 
sanctions. We observe laws that we see as inherently good for us and 
expedient for our local environments. If laws are developed in 
procedurally sound ways, we tend to observe them, even if we do not 
agree with the substantive provisions. Procedurally sound law and 
policy development presents civil society with an opportunity to take 
a meaningful part in the decision-making process, including having an 
opportunity to present our views, to be heard, and to have our views 
considered by the authorities. Just as it is important to incorporate 
public participation provisions in the creation of laws, so can it be 
beneficial to incorporate civil society in law enforcement to the extent 
feasible seen from a practical point of view.378 Finally, people tend to 
be more willing to observe laws created by “competent” 
governments—in other words, those that are seen as impartial and 
just. Authorities are beginning to take note of the importance of 
public participation. For example, one study shows that 85% of a 
select range of local sustainability plans included policies for public 
awareness, participation, and education.379 
What emerges from this is the fact that to create new solutions to 
pressing legal issues, we should develop new solutions to law 
enforcement as well as to law creation. Importantly, we should dare to 
 
378 See the author’s analysis of this in Marianne Dellinger, Ten Years of the Aarhus 
Convention: How Procedural Democracy is Paving the Way for Substantive Change in 
National and International Environmental Law, 23 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 
309 (2012). 
379 Arnold, supra note 90, at 858. 
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move away from yesterday’s traditional, adversarial approaches that 
may at one level be efficient, but at another may create more hostility 
and resentment of government bodies than what is desirable. Instead, 
just as governments are more and more often expected or even 
required to collaborate with an increasingly broad range of other 
government agencies and civil society actors, so should such 
cooperation and the hopefully resulting innovations of legal schemes 
be enforced in cooperative ways. This model is emerging as an 
efficient way of reaching the desired ultimate substantive goals. 
Authorities would be well advised to consider this approach. 
Similarly, public involvement at all stages of law creation and 
enforcement is also a recognized boon to society in general. 
Authorities should learn from this development and implement 
greater amounts of involvement by civil society organizations as the 
true stakeholders of the action to be taken. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article demonstrated how bottom-up, polycentric, collaborative 
approaches to lawmaking and –enforcement present relatively 
untraditional, yet effective, inroads to progress in both human rights 
and environmental law on the national and international scales. The 
Article argued that although “law” is often understood to be law 
formally adopted by governments, the concept is broad enough to also 
encompass moral and ethical aspects. Such “softer” notions of law are 
important to the legal discourse within both human rights and 
environmental law. Further, because civil society tends to more 
readily adhere to mandates that are seen as  inherently “good” and 
beneficial to society at large than more narrowly framed, top-down 
negative notions of what cannot be done, framing new legal mandates 
from a positive and aspirational angle is beneficial. Similarly, 
drawing on non-Western ideals as well as ancient notions of natural 
law has the potential of creating more equitable solutions seen from 
both an ecocentric and anthropological angle. 
The Article also demonstrated the modernly recognized importance 
of public participation to norm-formation and formal lawmaking. 
New solutions incorporating civil society stakeholders as well as 
multi-level governance units have proven to be not only viable and 
effective both procedurally and substantively. Even if bottom-up, 
collaborative approaches to lawmaking do not initially lead to the 
adoption of formal law, they have been demonstrated to lead to the 
creation of social norms that over time will fossilize into formal law. 
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And just as collaborative solutions are an advantage in connection 
with the creation of law, so do the experiments analyzed above show 
that collaboration in law enforcement may be an equally or more 
effective than traditional, adversarial law enforcement. 
In short, new directions within the fields of human rights and 
environmental law must involve multi-stakeholder, multi-level action 
for more progressive solutions within shorter time-frames than what 
is often the case with traditional large-scale, top-down approaches. 
The time has come to take action on multiple fronts and to apply a 
multitude of approaches and policy instruments to make much needed 
progress. Now as never before, we need “all hands on deck” to handle 
persistent and urgent socio-legal problems both within and beyond 
human rights and the environment. 
 
